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WHAT’S (STILL) WRONG WITH CREDIT RATINGS? 
Frank Partnoy* 
Abstract: Scholars and regulators generally agree that credit rating agency failures were 
at the center of the recent financial crisis. Congress responded to these failures with reforms 
in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. This Article demonstrates that those reforms have failed. 
Instead, regulators have thwarted Congress’s intent at every turn. As a result, the major credit 
rating agencies continue to be hugely profitable, yet generate little or no informational value. 
The fundamental problems that led to the financial crisis—overreliance on credit ratings, a 
lack of oversight and accountability, and primitive methodologies—remain as significant as 
they were before the financial crisis. This Article addresses each of these problems and 
proposes several solutions. 
First, although Congress attempted to remove credit rating agency “regulatory licenses,” 
the references to ratings in various statutes and rules, regulatory reliance on ratings remains 
pervasive. This Article shows that regulated institutions continue to rely mechanistically on 
ratings and demonstrates that regulations continue to reference ratings, notwithstanding the 
Congressional mandate to remove references. This Article suggests several paths to reduce 
reliance. 
Second, although Congress authorized new oversight measures, including an Office of 
Credit Ratings (OCR), that oversight has been ineffective. Annual investigations have 
uncovered numerous failures, many in the same mortgage-related areas that precipitated the 
financial crisis, but regulators have imposed minimal discipline on violators. Moreover, 
because regulators refuse to identify particular rating agencies in OCR reports, wrongdoers 
do not suffer reputational costs. This Article proposes reforms to the OCR that would 
enhance its independence and sharpen the impact of its investigations. 
Third, although Congress authorized new accountability measures, particularly removing 
rating agencies’ exemptions from liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 and 
Regulation FD, the Securities and Exchange Commission has gutted both of those provisions. 
The SEC performed an end-run around Dodd-Frank’s explicit requirements, reversing the 
express will of Congress. Litigation has not been effective as an accountability measure, 
either, in part because rating agencies continue to assert the dubious argument that ratings are 
protected speech. This Article argues that the SEC should reverse course and implement 
Congress’s intent, including encouraging private litigation. 
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Finally, given the ongoing problems in these three areas, it is no surprise that credit rating 
agency methodologies remain unreliable. This Article concludes by illustrating the weakness 
of current methodologies with a particular focus on the treatment of diversification and 
investment holding companies. This Article argues that neither regulators nor investors 
should rely on such crude and uninformative methodologies. 
This Article’s overarching recommendation is straightforward: both regulators and 
investors should reduce reliance on credit ratings, and regulators should implement 
Congress’s will with respect to rating agency oversight and accountability. Credit rating 
agencies are a cautionary example of regulatory stickiness, meaning that reliance on ratings 
has proven difficult to undo. More generally, the stickiness of regulatory licenses is a 
warning for policymakers who are considering deferring to private entities for regulatory 
purposes in other areas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Academics have long recognized the unique and important role of 
credit rating agencies in financial markets.1 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
                                                     
1. Credit rating agencies have been a topic of academic interest since well before the recent 
financial crisis. See GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL 
OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 6–9 (1938) (discussing the history of credit ratings and the increased 
reliance on ratings in the aftermath of the 1929 market crash); W. BRADDOCK HICKMAN, 
CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR EXPERIENCE (1958) (analyzing default rates based on 
different ratings categories); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two 
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the scholarly consensus about credit rating agencies centered on the 
“reputational capital” view—a theory, based on information economics,2 
that credit rating agencies survived and prospered based on their ability 
to generate and aggregate credible information about debt issues.3 The 
essence of the reputational capital view is that credit rating agencies fill 
an important need arising from the information asymmetry between 
issuers and investors: credit rating agencies are reputational 
intermediaries that bridge the information gap, not unlike restaurant or 
movie reviewers, except that they use letters (such as AAA) instead of 
stars or tomatoes.4 
Beginning in 1999, I set forth a more critical alternative view of credit 
rating agencies, which I called the “regulatory license” view, based in 
large part on the empirical observation that regulators and market 
                                                     
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 628–36 (1999) (discussing 
the early academic literature on credit rating agencies). 
2. Information economics dominated the thinking of legal scholars throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Marcel Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” 
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to 
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995); Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and 
Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1997).  
3. For example, Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman described credit rating agencies as one of 
several reputational intermediaries (including underwriters and auditors) that pledged reputational 
capital as a commitment to support their role collecting and disseminating information in financial 
markets. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
VA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (1984) (describing “information intermediaries” and noting that “in the 
financial markets, the most obvious example is the role played by rating agencies such as Standard 
& Poor’s and Moody’s”). Similarly, Stephen Choi and Jonathan Macey described credit rating 
agencies as reputational intermediaries that played a private certification role without regulatory 
support. See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 934 (1998) 
(citing Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s as examples of how “intermediaries play a certification role 
without any regulatory intervention”); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How 
Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1500 (1998) 
(praising credit rating agencies and concluding: “[i]ndeed, the only reason that rating agencies are 
able to charge fees at all is because the public has enough confidence in the integrity of these ratings 
to find them of value in evaluating the riskiness of investments”); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. 
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073, 1110 
(1995) (“Information intermediaries, such as securities analysts or credit rating agencies, facilitate 
such conventions by decoding ambiguous signals.”). 
4. Financial economists have viewed credit ratings as screening mechanisms for information that 
is unavailable publicly and as attempts to distinguish among issuers of inferior quality and thereby 
avoid “average quality pricing.” See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
The Theory of “Screening,” Education, and the Distribution of Income, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 
283 (1975). 
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participants increasingly relied on credit ratings in substantive legal 
rules, and that this regulatory reliance distorted the market for credit 
ratings.5 The essence of the regulatory license view is that credit rating 
agencies are important, not because they provide valuable information, 
but because regulatory reliance on credit ratings effectively makes 
ratings valuable as a kind of financial license that unlocks access to the 
markets—even if the ratings themselves have little or no informational 
content. 
Before the introduction of regulation, the credit rating business was 
small and relatively unprofitable.6 But, regulatory reliance on credit 
rating agencies started increasing during the mid-1970s from references 
in statutes and rules to “Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings 
Organizations,” or NRSROs, particularly to the two most prominent 
rating agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and S&P Global 
Ratings Inc., and—to a lesser extent—Fitch Inc.; as regulatory licenses 
proliferated, NRSROs became both more profitable and less 
informative.7 
During the 2000s, the scholarly literature took multiple perspectives 
about the above two theoretical frameworks.8 On one hand was the 
argument that, notwithstanding some prominent miscues (such as 
Enron’s investment grade credit ratings shortly before its bankruptcy in 
2001), credit ratings overall were correlated with fixed income default 
experience and arguably reflected at least some information about 
issuers’ creditworthiness.9 On the other hand was the argument that 
regulatory reliance on credit rating agencies continued to increase 
throughout this time, even while sophisticated market participants 
viewed credit ratings more skeptically.10 
                                                     
5. See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 1, at 683–706 (describing the “regulatory license” 
view). Other scholars subsequently have noted that the “reputational capital” and “regulatory 
license” views are the two standard theories about the role of credit rating agencies. See Robert J. 
Rhee, Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist, 44 ECON. NOTES 161, 168 (2015); Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-72936, 109 SEC Docket 3429 (Oct. 
14, 2014) (to be codified as 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240, 249 and 249(b)) (describing the increase in 
regulatory reliance on ratings). 
6. See Partnoy, Siskel and Ebert, supra note 1, at 636–48. 
7. See id. at 692–94. 
8. See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach 
for Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (2009) (giving an overview of credit rating 
agencies and the problems with their ratings of subprime-backed assets before the crisis). 
9. See Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 44 (2004) 
(disputing the regulatory license view and the need for reform, and defending the rating agencies as 
doing a good job providing information). 
10. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
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Likewise, before 2007, regulators’ views of credit rating agencies 
were mixed. Regulators were sympathetic to the important role of credit 
ratings in financial markets, but also were critical of potential problems 
related to that role, including perceptions of agency costs and conflicts 
of interest.11 In 2006, Congress adopted modest reforms to address 
perceived problems associated with credit rating agencies, even as 
regulators in a wide variety of areas continued to rely substantively on 
credit ratings.12 
Throughout this time, I offered the regulatory license view as a theory 
to explain the ongoing paradox in fixed income markets: that credit 
ratings were enormously important, yet possessed little informational 
value.13 I warned regulators and policy makers about the potentially 
toxic role of credit rating agencies in the use of credit default swaps and 
the creation of synthetic collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs.14 In 
particular, I criticized the reliance on crude mathematical models that 
                                                     
34, 283–98 (2006) (criticizing credit rating agencies and discussing the regulatory reliance on 
ratings). Leading institutional investors employed far more sophisticated methodologies than the 
ones used by the leading credit rating agencies. See Jane Tripp Howe, Credit Analysis for Corporate 
Bonds, in BOND CREDIT ANALYSIS: FRAMEWORK & CASE STUDIES (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2001); 
Kamakura Credit Risk, KAMAKURA CORP., http://www.kamakuraco.com/Solutions/Kamakura 
RiskManager/CreditRisk.aspx [https://perma.cc/EY9F-FJYR]. 
11. See Jeffrey Manns, Downgrading Rating Agency Reform, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749, 750–
51 (2013) (describing the bases for various credit rating agency reform approaches).  
12. The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 provided authority to the SEC to implement 
registration, recordkeeping, financial reporting, and oversight rules. See Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 137; SEC, Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies 
Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-55857, 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249b (June 5, 2007); SEC, Amendments to Rules for Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-59342, 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240 and 240b (Feb. 2, 2009); SEC, Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61050, 17 C.F.R. pts 240 and 243 (Nov. 23, 
2009). 
13. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, 
in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 61 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert 
E. Litan eds., 2006). 
14. See id. at 73–80; FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW RISK AND DECEIT CORRUPTED 
THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 374–92 (2003) (warning about abuses in credit default swaps and CDOs 
and concluding that CDOs “posed even greater dangers to the global economy”); Letter from Frank 
Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y of Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n on Proposed Rule, Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 
Release No. 34-51572, IC-26834, File No. S7-04-05 (June 9, 2005) (on file with the author); Frank 
Partnoy, Testimony at Hearings before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee 
on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, “Legislative Solutions for 
the Rating Agency Duopoly” (June 29, 2005). 
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did not adequately account for the correlation of CDO assets.15 This was 
all during the early- and mid-2000s, before 2007.16 
Then came the global financial crisis of 2007–08. The crisis occurred 
when it became apparent that major financial institutions had used 
complex and opaque transactions to take on substantial undisclosed 
exposure to subprime mortgage markets.17 The credit rating agencies 
facilitated these transactions by giving a range of risky financial 
instruments related to subprime mortgages very high credit ratings; 
when the subprime mortgage market collapsed, so did these transactions, 
and crisis ensued. 
Numerous scholars chronicled the revelation of bad news about the 
highly rated fixed income securities at the center of the financial crisis.18 
After the bankruptcy declaration of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 
2008, the previously mixed assessment of the role of credit rating 
agencies with respect to such securities became far more critical.19 
                                                     
15. See Partnoy, How and Why, supra note 13, at 78 (concluding that the “credit rating agencies 
are providing the markets with an opportunity to arbitrage the credit rating agencies’ mistakes” and 
that “[t]he problems with how CDO pricing models incorporate various measures of correlation 
among assets are even more troubling”). 
16. David Skeel and I elaborated on the problems associated with credit derivatives and credit 
rating agencies in 2007. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 (2007). 
17. For a detailed description of the role of the credit rating agencies in the financial crisis, see 
Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of the Crisis, in THE 
PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM (Lawrence Mitchell & 
Arthur Wilmarth eds., 2010). 
18. See, e.g., ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. 
MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 
(2011); ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013); DAVID A. SKEEL, 
THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) 
CONSEQUENCES (2011); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS: RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL 
MARKETS (2009); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009); 
Adam Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the Financial Crisis, 63 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 999, 999–1010 (2009); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal 
Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. 
REV. 963 (2009).  
19. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, numerous scholars wrote critically about the role of 
credit rating agencies and potential reform, reaching a wide range of conclusions. See, e.g., Lynn 
Bai, On Regulating Conflict of Interests in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 253 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., Ratings Reform: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, 1 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 231 (2011); John P. Hunt, One Cheer for Credit Rating Agencies: How the 
Mark-to-Market Accounting Debate Highlights the Case for Rating-Dependent Regulation, 60 S.C. 
L. REV. 749 (2009); Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply Persistently Conflicted: Credit Rating Agencies in 
the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227 (2009); Manns, supra note 8; 
Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 341 (2006); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).  
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Government investigations ultimately found that the credit rating 
agencies, particularly Moody’s and S&P, were central villains in the 
crisis and that the crisis could not have happened without their 
misconduct. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission called the ratings 
agencies “key enablers of the financial meltdown.”20 The U.S. Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations concluded: “[i]naccurate 
AAA credit ratings introduced risk into the U.S. financial system and 
constituted a key cause of the financial crisis.”21 The Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the President’s Working Group on Financial 
Markets reached similar conclusions.22 
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act,23 which requires 
federal agencies to replace regulatory references to credit ratings with 
“appropriate” substitutes.24 Dodd-Frank amended the securities laws to 
enhance the accountability and transparency of credit rating agencies 
and to create a new Office of Credit Ratings within the SEC to oversee 
them.25 In addition, federal and state prosecutors settled cases against 
S&P and Moody’s,26 and there were a handful of private investor 
lawsuits.27 
                                                     
20. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xxv (2011) (“We 
conclude the failures of credit rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial 
destruction. The three credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial meltdown. The 
mortgage-related securities at the heart of the crisis could not have been marketed and sold without 
their seal of approval. Investors relied on them, often blindly. In some cases, they were obligated to 
use them, or regulatory capital standards were hinged on them. This crisis could not have happened 
without the rating agencies. Their ratings helped the market soar and their downgrades through 2007 
and 2008 wreaked havoc across markets and firms.”). 
21. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 6 (2011). 
22. See SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 12 n.8 (2008); THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING 
GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008). 
23. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-
Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. For a 
discussion of the Dodd-Frank reforms related to credit rating agencies, see Aline Darbellay & Frank 
Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y 
REPORT 1, 2 (2011); Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies and Regulatory 
Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW (Claire A. Hill & 
James L. Krusemark eds., 2012). 
24. Dodd-Frank Act § 939A(a)(1)–(2), (b). 
25. See id. § 932. 
26. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and State Partners Secure $1.375 
Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up to the Financial Crisis (Feb. 3, 
2015); Moody’s Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 13, 2017). 
27. See Moody’s Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 105–6 (Feb. 25, 2016) (describing private 
lawsuits); Carrie Guo, Note, Credit Rating Agency Reform: A Review of Dodd-Frank Section 
 
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
1414 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1407 
 
This Article assesses these regulatory changes. The overarching point 
is that they have had little or no impact, and that therefore the same 
credit rating-related dangers, market distortions, and inefficient 
allocations of capital that led to the 2007–08 global financial crisis 
potentially remain today. 
Nearly a decade after that crisis, the major credit rating agencies 
remain among the powerful and profitable institutions in the world.28 
The market for credit ratings continues to be a large and impenetrable 
oligopoly dominated by two firms: Moody’s and S&P.29 And yet credit 
ratings are still as uninformative as they were before the financial 
crisis.30 Simply put, credit ratings remain enormously important but have 
little or no informational value.31 
                                                     
933(B)’s Effect (Or Lack Thereof) Since Enactment, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 184, 187 n.6 
(reviewing federal dockets on PACER and finding only a handful of complaints filed against credit 
rating agencies since 2010). 
28. The aggregate market capitalization of the two major credit rating agencies, Moody’s 
Investors Service, Inc. and S&P Global Ratings Inc., was nearly $50 billion in aggregate as of 
February 2017. See Moody’s Corporation (MCO), YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/ 
quote/MCO?p=MCO [https://perma.cc/85M3-H29C] (Moody’s market capitalization of $19.3 
billion); S&P Global, Inc., YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SPGI/?p=SPGI 
[https://perma.cc/ZFU6-FEAD] (S&P market capitalization of $30.1 billion). Moreover, 
profitability measures at both Moody’s and S&P are among the highest of any public companies. 
For example, Moody’s 2015 operating margins were forty-two percent higher than the operating 
margins in any sector of the U.S. economy measured by financial economists, including the peer 
group Moody’s uses for purposes of benchmarking executive compensation. See Moody’s 2016 
Form 10-K, supra note 27, at 14, 37; NYU Global Datasets, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS. (Jan. 
2016), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html [https://perma. 
cc/Y6FV-C5UT]; Moody’s Corp., Schedule 14A Information 40 (Mar. 2, 2016); Mary Ellen Biery, 
These Industries Generate the Highest Profit Margins, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/2015/09/06/these-industries-generate-the-highest-profit-
margins/#6a4c52c264ac [https://perma.cc/P4MX-8AFD] (finding lower profit margins in other 
industries). This Article discusses the profitability, power, and influence of Moody’s and S&P in 
detail in Part I. 
29. See Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Agencies: An Analysis Through the Lenses of 
Industrial Organization, Finance, and Regulation, 21 PAC. ECON. REV. 202, 202 (2016) 
(documenting the credit rating agency oligopoly). 
30. See Valentin Dimitrov, Darius Palia & Leo Tang, Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Credit 
Ratings, 115 J. FIN. ECON. 505, 506 (2015) (finding that after the Dodd-Frank Act, credit rating 
agencies issued lower ratings, gave more false warnings, and issued downgrades that were less 
informative); Rhee, Why Credit Rating Agencies Exist, supra note 5, at 171 (arguing that credit 
rating agencies produce little new information, but simply play a sorting function). As noted below, 
Dimitrov, Palia, & Tang suggest that increased regulatory costs were responsible for the decline in 
the informativeness of ratings, a suggestion that is not uncontroversial. See infra note 85. 
31. I discussed this continuing paradox in Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit Ratings, in THE 
ROLE OF CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (Richard M. Levitch, 
Giovanni Majnoni, & Carmen Reinhart eds., 2002). Credit rating agencies have responded that 
credit ratings are correlated with actual default experience. See STANDARD AND POOR’S RATINGS 
SERVICES, 2014 ANNUAL GLOBAL CORPORATE DEFAULT STUDY AND RATING TRANSITIONS 35 
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This Article makes two central contributions. First, it describes the 
effects of changes in credit rating regulation. Although numerous 
scholars criticized the rating agencies in the immediate aftermath of the 
financial crisis, scholarly attention to credit rating agencies has waned 
since this initial wave of commentary.32 In particular, no scholar has 
undertaken a thorough assessment of how the sweeping changes in 
regulation after the financial crisis have impacted the rating agencies, 
their methodologies, and the role they play in financial markets. 
Second, this Article demonstrates that the regulatory changes have 
failed to address the problems generated by the proliferation of 
regulatory licenses. Deleting references in some statutes and regulation 
was a good first step. But many important institutions continue to rely 
mechanistically on ratings.33 Moreover, Congress did not amend—and 
thus did not impact—either state law or international regulation of 
various financial functions. After more than three decades of sustained 
reliance on NRSRO ratings, many institutions need guidance to be 
weaned off such ratings. Some regulators are working to that end, but 
many are not.34 
The need for the next regulatory step—encouraging and facilitating 
reduced reliance on ratings—is consistent with theories of “stickiness” 
offered by behavioral law and economics scholars.35 Corporate and 
securities law scholars have addressed stickiness in default rules and the 
                                                     
(2015) (showing that lower ratings are associated with greater default vulnerability). However, it 
would be surprising if they were not: anyone with a Bloomberg subscription and a basic knowledge 
of financial statements can publish credit ratings that are correlated with defaults, simply by 
following market prices, reading the news, and then adjusting ratings. Scholarly efforts are more 
skeptical about whether credit ratings have any informational utility. See Dimitrov, Palia & Tang, 
supra note 30, at 429; Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap 
Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2114 (2010) 
(documenting that credit default swap spreads incorporated information significantly more quickly 
than credit ratings). 
32. Regulators have implored academics to address recent changes regarding credit rating 
agencies. See Seth Carpenter, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks Before the 
Nat’l Economists Club (Sept. 25, 2015), in Treas. JL-180, at 1.  
33. See infra Part I. 
34. Dodd-Frank’s charge that regulators should protect users of credit ratings arguably includes 
authority to ensure implementation of the statutory directive to remove references to credit ratings. 
See Dodd-Frank Act § 932. 
35. Of particular relevance is scholarship exploring the extent to which contract default rules can 
be sticky, particularly when use is widespread, as in boilerplate. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006); Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 
121 YALE L.J. 2032 (2012); Omni Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default 
Rules, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 651 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the 
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990); Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).  
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potential for path dependence.36 Relatedly, other scholars have assessed 
the potential benefits of “temporary legislation” or “sunset clauses,” in 
substantial part to force regulators to justify rules and avoid regulatory 
stickiness.37 
This Article contributes to these literatures by demonstrating how 
regulatory reliance can be a source of stickiness, meaning that once 
market participants have begun relying on a particular measure, it is 
difficult and costly for them to stop. The use of letter ratings to assess 
bond credit during the early twentieth century was facilitated by path 
dependence and the simplicity of a coordinated solution, not unlike the 
adoption of technology standards generally.38 During those earlier times, 
any resulting inefficiencies were minor and the credit rating business 
was small and did not impose significant externality costs, such as 
systemic risk. Before the mid-1970s, credit ratings, like many other 
financial market standards, did not derive their value from regulatory 
reliance. 
However, once regulatory references to credit ratings began to 
proliferate, and regulatory licenses became more common and valuable, 
reliance on credit ratings became far stickier. Today, this stickiness 
exacerbates difficulties in implementing Dodd-Frank’s move away from 
references to ratings. Thus, this Article also contributes to the academic 
debate about the relationship between regulation and standard setting, 
and offers the stickiness of reliance on credit ratings as a cautionary 
example for other regulated areas.39 
                                                     
36. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991); Steven M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent 
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999); Lucian 
Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1408–
15 (1989); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History in Corporate Law, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 439, 444–49 (2001); Brett McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 
SMU L. REV. 383 (2007). 
37. See Jacob Gerson, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (2007); Robert W. Hahn, 
Achieving Real Regulatory Reform, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 143, 156 (1997); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Cynthia R. Farina, New Theories of the Regulatory State: Cognitive Psychology and Optimal 
Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 605 (2002). 
38. See Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169 (2007) 
(assessing how private parties can benefit from the adoption of standards in various areas, including 
the early twentieth century adoption of standards related to credit ratings and Underwriters 
Laboratory assessments). 
39. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291 (2005); Jody Freeman, The Private 
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); 
Frank Partnoy, Second-Order Benefits from Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 169 (2007); Sidney A. 
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Specifically, this Article assesses these issues in three major areas of 
credit rating agency reform. Part I assesses efforts to remove regulatory 
licenses. Part II examines the attempts at enhanced oversight, including 
recent examinations by the new Office of Credit Ratings and findings of 
ongoing rating agency failures. Part III addresses recent changes in 
accountability, particularly through government and private litigation. 
In each of these three areas—regulatory licenses, oversight, and 
accountability—I show that reforms have been inadequate.40 Regulatory 
licenses persist. Office of Credit Ratings (OCR) oversight has not 
resulted in any meaningful sanctions and OCR findings are mostly 
anonymous, so rating agencies do not even suffer reputational costs. 
Government settlements with S&P in 2015 and Moody’s in 2017 had 
little impact, and the rating agencies have hampered future enforcement 
through lobbying efforts that led to the gutting of two important Dodd-
Frank reforms: the provision for liability under section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the removal of the rating agency exemption 
under Regulation FD.41 In each instance, Congress passed an important 
statutory provision, only to have it undone.42 This Article argues that any 
substantive reform of credit rating agencies should begin in these areas, 
by implementing the express will of Congress. 
In Part IV, the Article turns to the effects of these regulatory failures 
on the credit rating agencies’ methodologies. The literature has largely 
ignored the specifics of rating agency methodologies, even though 
flawed methodologies were central in the financial crisis. My goal in this 
Part is to show how current rating methodologies remain flawed, overly 
simplistic, nonsensical, and arbitrarily subjective. The Article also 
examines two methodological approaches in detail, the treatment of 
diversification and of investment holding companies (IHCs), where 
                                                     
Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003). The regulatory reaction to, 
and the absence of judicial review of, federal credit rating agency reforms are consistent with the 
observation that much administrative practice falls far short of the goals of “transparency, rule of 
law, and reasoned implementation of statutory mandates.” Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph 
O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2014). 
40. The regulation of credit rating agencies is thus consistent with extant theories about the 
problems of both market failure and regulatory failure. See Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, 
in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 17 (David A. Moss & John A. Cisternino eds., 2009); 
Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1,  
20–21 (2003) (discussing regulatory failure at the SEC); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 904 (2002) (discussing regulatory failure among judges). 
41. See infra sections III.A–B.  
42. See id. 
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
1418 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1407 
 
revised approaches make little sense and fail to generate useful 
information. 
It is difficult to anticipate when an area of credit ratings might prove 
to be as inaccurate as those that precipitated the financial crisis. Yet 
given continuing methodological flaws, another instance of widespread 
credit rating agency mistakes seems inevitable. If the markets experience 
another crisis related to credit ratings, and ratings prove again to have 
been “garbage out,” then during any potential future regulatory response 
it will be important to understand more clearly the role of the “garbage 
in.”43 
By exposing the major credit rating agencies’ flawed methodologies, 
this Article hopes to encourage market participants to look elsewhere in 
their assessments of credit risk and to prod regulators to help them do so. 
Leading institutional investors and analysts of corporate bond credit risk 
have long employed far more subtle and sophisticated methods than 
those reflected in the credit rating agencies’ methodologies.44 A modern 
sophisticated assessment of corporate bond credit risk could include not 
only analysis of market prices and related variables,45 but also option-
adjusted valuation and risk assessment, simulations of income statement 
variables, stress tests of risk factors, and detailed consideration of 
recovery rates.46 Market participants should rely less on credit ratings 
and more on fundamental factors, such as market measures of credit risk, 
financial measures of leverage and profitability, accounting measures of 
earnings and cash flow, and worst-case scenario analysis with respect to 
both individual credits and portfolios. 
Fundamentally, unwarranted and mechanistic reliance is what is still 
wrong with credit ratings. This Article suggests some regulatory reforms 
                                                     
43. In the aftermath of the 2007–08 financial crisis, it was difficult for regulators and 
commentators to ascertain the details associated with the methodologies behind the high credit 
ratings on mortgage-related fixed income instruments. It is my hope that, if there is another crisis, 
scholars will be able to look to this Article for a description of the relevant methodologies in use 
today. 
44. See Howe, supra note 10, at 343–71 (describing Pacific Investment Management Company’s 
approach, including a detailed and subtle analysis of eight industry consideration variables, various 
approaches to financial ratio analyses, analyses of the components of a company’s return on equity, 
and consideration of non-financial factors such as management, foreign exposure, and indenture 
provisions). 
45. See Kamakura Credit Risk, supra note 10 (describing the factors in Kamakura’s proprietary 
models for assessing corporate credit risk). 
46. See Rainer Jankowitsch, Florian Nagler & Marti G. Subrahmanyam, The Determinants of 
Recovery Rates in the US Corporate Bond Market, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 155, 156 (2014) (considering 
the impact of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, macroeconomic variables, and various 
liquidity measures on corporate bond recovery rates). 
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to remedy this ongoing problem. Ultimately, both regulators and 
investors should stop relying extensively on credit ratings. 
I. THE LEGACY OF REGULATORY LICENSES 
This Article begins by assessing the stickiness of regulatory licenses 
despite reform efforts. It traces the development of these reforms and 
documents the continuing reliance on credit ratings even after the 
reforms. 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, Congress adopted a proposal to 
remove regulatory licenses from federal law. Specifically, section 939A 
of Dodd-Frank provided for the removal of NRSRO references from 
both statutes and regulations.47 
Some regulators have not only removed NRSRO references but have 
also undertaken to help transition regulated institutions away from 
reliance on ratings. However, very few attempts at regulatory reform 
have been successful, illustrating the stickiness of regulatory  
licenses—licenses that entitle market participants to be in compliance 
with regulation. The best example of a successful attempt at reform is 
efforts by bank regulators. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) has provided guidance to regulated banks to help them transition 
away from relying on NRSRO ratings48 and instead perform due 
diligence to determine whether issuers of debt securities have “an 
adequate capacity to meet financial commitments under the security for 
the projected life of the asset or exposure.”49 
The FDIC advises that, in order to make this assessment, banks 
should determine that “the risk of default by the obligor is low” by 
performing due diligence, with the depth of the due diligence being “a 
function of the security’s credit quality, the complexity of the structure, 
and the size of the investment.”50 Banks may use credit ratings in their 
due diligence, but they also must consider and document other factors; 
                                                     
47. Dodd-Frank Act § 939A(a)(1)–(2), (b). 
48. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Alternatives to the Use of External Credit 
Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC, 77 Fed. Reg. 35253-59 (June 13, 2012) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 1, 5, 16, 28, and 160); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Revised Standards of Creditworthiness 
for Investment Securities, Financial Institution Letter FIL-48-201 (Nov. 16, 2012); Alternatives to 
the Use of External Credit Ratings in the Regulations of the OCC, OCC Bulletin 2012-18 [75 Fed. 
Reg. 49,423] (June 26, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1, 6, and 28).  
49. See Investment Securities: New Rules for Assessing Credit Risk, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 2014 FDIC Chicago Region Regulatory Conference Call Series, FDIC 6 (Apr. 24, 
2014), https://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/chicago_region/2014-04-24.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7RV3-WAMJ]. 
50. See id. at 6, 7. 
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they may outsource data and analysis, but must make the final 
decision.51 The FDIC cites market-based measures of credit risk as one 
source of data.52 
Similarly, the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) Office 
of Examination and Insurance published guidance for credit unions 
transitioning away from reliance on NRSRO ratings.53 Regulators 
recommended that credit unions consider several alternatives to credit 
ratings: credit spreads,54 securities-related research, internal or external 
credit assessments, default statistics, inclusion on an index, priorities, 
and enhancements, and various market data, including price, yield, 
and/or volume.55 The guidance notes that ratings may be used to 
supplement a credit union’s analysis but should not be the sole basis for 
determining the suitability of investments.56 NCUA regulators 
understand the implicit requirement that they not only remove references 
to ratings but assist with the transition away from mechanistic reliance.57 
These regulatory efforts recognize that NRSRO ratings lack 
informational content, and they embrace more information-rich 
measures, such as market measures of credit risk, along with 
fundamental analyses.58 
                                                     
51. See id. at 8. 
52. See id. at 14–18. Likewise, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors also has confronted the 
stickiness of community bank reliance on NRSRO ratings, explaining in newsletters how banks can 
rely on market data in their credit assessments. See Christopher McBride, Investing in Securities 
Without Relying on External Credit Ratings, Community Banking Connections, FED. RESERVE SYS. 
(2013), https://www.communitybankingconnections.org/articles/2013/Q2/Investing-in-Securities-
Without-Relying-on-External-Credit-Ratings [https://perma.cc/R8BD-RSLU]. 
53. Regulators warned that many corporate credit unions had “placed undue reliance on NRSRO 
credit ratings by failing to perform an independent analysis of the credit-worthiness of an 
investment.” Supervisory Letter from the Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Office of Examination and 
Ins., to All Field Staff, Investing in Securities Without Reliance on Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSRO) Ratings 2 (June 11, 2013). 
54. A credit spread is the difference between the yield on a bond and the risk-free rate, and 
represents a market-based reflection of the credit risk associated with a debt security. See Flannery, 
Houston & Partnoy, Viable Substitutes, supra note 31, at 2087. 
55. See Supervisory Letter from the NCUA, supra note 53, at 3–4. 
56. See id. at 3–6 (noting that the depth of the due diligence should be a function of the 
security’s credit quality, the complexity of the structure, and the size of the investment). 
57. See id. at 8 (“The removal of credit ratings from regulations compels NCUA to reiterate the 
importance of having a sound due diligence process within the credit union to manage investment 
credit risk.”). 
58. For example, Pacific Investment Management Co., known as PIMCO, has taken a more 
sophisticated approach to investing in bonds, advocating a range of strategies relating to 
fundamental “bottom up” credit analysis; macroeconomic, sector, and market analysis; duration 
management; yield curve positioning; and roll down, as well as the use of derivatives and various 
risk management techniques. See Everything You Need to Know About Bonds, PIMCO (2017), 
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Unfortunately, these regulatory efforts are exceptional, and section 
939A has not accomplished its objectives for several reasons. First, and 
most basically, although Dodd-Frank mandated the removal of 
regulatory licenses, it did not address all of them. Federal law still 
includes references to the “investment grade” credit rating delineation.59 
For example, rules governing U.S. highway infrastructure finance 
include such “regulatory licenses” based on S&P and Moody’s 
nomenclature (though without the term NRSRO).60 Similar requirements 
exist for water infrastructure finance projects.61 Indeed, numerous 
volumes of the U.S. Code still include references to investment-grade 
credit rating requirements.62 
Second, and similarly, in Dodd-Frank the regulators who were 
charged with removing regulatory licenses did an incomplete job; many 
references to credit ratings remain. Consider Rule 2a-7 of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, which had defined “eligible securities” for 
money market funds based on NRSRO ratings.63 Rule 2a-7 required that 
97% of a fund’s securities have NRSRO ratings in the top short-term 
                                                     
https://www.pimco.com/resources/education/everything-you-need-to-know-about-bonds 
[https://perma.cc/UV48-MFFQ]. 
59. 23 U.S.C. § 601(a)(4) (2012). 
60. Federal law currently provides that “[t]he funding of a line of credit under this section shall 
be contingent on the senior obligations of the project receiving an investment-grade rating from 2 
rating agencies.” Id. § 604(a)(4). The term “investment-grade rating” is then defined as “a rating of 
BBB minus, Baa3, bbb minus, BBB (low), or higher assigned by a rating agency to project 
obligations.” Id. § 601(a)(4) ; see also id. § 602(a)(2) (defining eligibility under federal programs as 
requiring an investment grade rating from at least two rating agencies); id. § 603(b) (providing for 
maximum amounts of secured loans based on investment grade ratings); id. § 610(g) (providing an 
alternative that infrastructure banks maintain a continuing investment grade rating). 
61. See 33 U.S.C. § 3908(a)(3) (2012) (“The execution of a secured loan under this section shall 
be contingent on receipt by the senior obligations of the project of an investment-grade rating.”); id. 
§ 3907(a)(1)(D) (requiring both preliminary opinion letters and final rating opinion letters “from at 
least 2 rating agencies indicating that the senior obligations of the project have an investment-grade 
rating”). The water infrastructure finance project requirements also are defined using the ratings 
symbols used by S&P and Moody’s. See id. § 3901 (“The term ‘investment-grade rating’ means a 
rating of BBB minus, Baa3, bbb minus, BBB (low), or higher assigned by a rating agency to project 
obligations.”). 
62. Similar requirements continue to exist with respect to legislation governing railroad industry 
direct loans and loan guarantees, 45 U.S.C. § 822(f)(3)(C) (2012), multi-family special affordable 
housing goals, 12 U.S.C. § 4563 (2012), premium rate benefit valuations for the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E)(iv) (2012), rural electrification and telephone 
service bond guarantees, 7 U.S.C. § 940c-1(b)(3)(B) (2012), the privatization of the college 
construction loan insurance association, 20 U.S.C. § 1155(b)(4) (2012), and limitations on the 
termination of single-employer retirement plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(5)(B)(i) (2012). 
63. See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the Issuer 
Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, Investment Company Release No. 
IC-31828, 17 C.F.R. §§ 270, 274 (Oct. 26, 2015). 
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credit quality category.64 Dodd-Frank tasked the SEC with proposing 
and implementing a new regime for “eligible securities” under Rule 2a-
7.65 
In 2014, the SEC replaced the NRSRO-focused language in Rule 2a-7 
with a general requirement that the boards of money market funds 
determine that a security “presents minimal credit risks” in order to be 
deemed eligible.66 Revised rules require that boards determine that a 
security “presents minimal credit risks” by analyzing four factors related 
to the issuer or guarantor: (1) its financial condition, (2) its sources of 
liquidity, (3) its ability to react to events, including ability to repay debt 
in a highly adverse situation, and (4) its competitive strength and 
position with the industry and the economy overall.67 
However, credit ratings did not entirely disappear from the Rule 2a-7 
regulatory standard. For example, although credit ratings were not 
explicitly included in Rule 2a-7’s definitions, the SEC adopted a new 
requirement that a fund’s board disclose NRSRO ratings on Form N-
MFP under certain circumstances.68 
Credit ratings continue to play a significant role in other federal 
regulation, in a wide range of areas, and regulators continue to adopt 
new regulations that depend on ratings. The 2016 Federal Reserve 
banking rules governing the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(TALF) provided that credit collateral requirements are based, in part, on 
whether collateral “[i]s registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization 
for issuers of asset-backed securities.”69 In 2016, the Federal 
Communications Commission adopted new rules that included a cutoff 
for letter of credit requirements based on whether the relevant entity had 
“maintain[ed] a credit rating of BBB- or better from Standard & Poor’s 
(or the equivalent from a nationally-recognized credit rating agency).”70 
Federal transportation regulations governing applications for financial 
assistance state that “[w]here an [a]pplicant has received a recent credit 
rating from one or more nationally recognized rating agencies, that 
                                                     
64. Id. at 8. 
65. Id. 
66. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010). 
67. See id. § 270.2a-7(a)(11)(i). 
68. See SEC (Form N-MFP Items C.10, 14–16). 
69. See 12 C.F.R. § 201.3(e)(3)(i) (2015). 
70. See Connect America Fund, ETC Annual Reports and Certifications, Rural Broadband 
Experiments, 81 Fed. Reg. 44414-01, 444426 (July 7, 2016) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 
54).  
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
2017] WHAT’S (STILL) WRONG WITH CREDIT RATINGS? 1423 
 
rating will be used to estimate the credit risk.”71 Even the SEC has been 
a victim of the stickiness associated with regulatory licenses, 
occasionally continuing to reference NRSROs after Dodd-Frank.72 Thus, 
the regulatory addiction to reliance on credit ratings continues unabated. 
Third, the Dodd-Frank mandate was limited to federal law. 
References to credit ratings remain embedded in much of the 
international regulatory regime, including Basel bank capital 
requirements, and regulators outside the U.S. continue to rely on credit 
ratings in various ways.73 Likewise, Dodd-Frank did not require removal 
of references to ratings in state legislation and regulation, much of which 
continues to reference NRSROs.74 
As a result, reliance on NRSRO ratings has been sticky even among 
the largest and most sophisticated global financial institutions. Some 
financial advisors, which are required to reduce reliance on NRSRO 
ratings, nevertheless recommend that their clients adopt such reliance in 
their investment guidelines.75 Portions of the shadow financial system 
also still depend on credit ratings. According to global surveys of repo 
market participants, NRSRO ratings continue to be important and market 
participants note that the requirement of a AAA rating persists.76 It 
remains unclear the extent to which global bank capital requirements 
ultimately will depend on credit ratings, although international banking 
                                                     
71. See 49 C.F.R. § 260.17(b)(1) (2016).  
72. See Staff Responses to Questions About Money Market Fund Reform, SEC (Aug. 7, 2012), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/mmfreform-imqa.htm [https://perma.cc/H97P-
UTBX] (referencing NRSRO requirement to disclose “Designated NRSROs”). 
73. For example, European financial institutions resisted efforts by European regulators to 
remove references to credit ratings. See Norbert J. Gaillard, Coping with Reliance on Credit 
Ratings, 35 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 12 (2016) (comparing U.S. and European 
approaches to regulatory reliance). 
74. See, e.g., CAL. GOV. CODE § 15819.4(a) (West 2017) (requiring that certain financing 
instruments “shall not be sold by the Treasurer unless, at the time . . . they are rated in the highest 
short-term rating category by a nationally recognized rating service”). 
75. Wells Fargo Asset Management recommends to its institutional clients: “[i]t is important to 
be specific about ratings. In particular, credit limits should specify the plus and minus tiers, such as 
whether a minimum rating of A means A- or only A.” See A PRIMER ON CASH INVESTMENT POLICY 
STATEMENTs, WELLS FARGO ASSET MGMT. (Dec. 2015), https://www.wellsfargofunds.com/assets/ 
pdf/fmg/icm/primer-cips.pdf [https://perma.cc/VTX8-U5HH]. 
76. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON REPO, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N 8 (Feb. 2013), 
http://www.treasurers.org/ACTmedia/Repo_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2SK-S5DU] (“A AAA-
rating is required by most investors” for asset-backed securities); id. (noting the decline in the use of 
mortgage-backed securities as repo collateral after the financial crisis, but stating that “[t]o be 
widely accepted as collateral, these issues need to be AAA- rated”). 
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regulators recently have indicated a willingness to retain some reliance 
on credit ratings.77 
Fourth, and perhaps most important, investor reliance on credit 
ratings continues, and the legacy of four decades of regulatory licenses 
persists, with many institutions continuing to look to credit ratings for 
various purposes. Notwithstanding efforts by some regulators, 
mechanistic reliance on NRSRO ratings continues in many market 
sectors, reflecting the stickiness of regulatory licenses. 
Although banks and credit unions have made some progress in 
reducing regulatory reliance, several other categories of institutional 
investors continue to rely mechanistically on NRSRO ratings, including 
states,78 counties,79 cities,80 municipal organizations,81 universities,82 and 
                                                     
77. See BASEL III DOCUMENT: REVISIONS TO THE SECURITIZATION FRAMEWORK, BASEL COMM. 
ON BANKING SUPERVISION 4 (July 2016), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
3T9L-FQY4] (suggesting adjustments to risk weights of mezzanine tranches of securitized debt 
instruments based on external credit ratings). 
78. On July 28, 2016, the state of West Virginia adopted an investment policy that relies 
explicitly and mechanistically on NRSRO ratings with respect to numerous investment types, 
including asset-backed commercial paper. See W. VA. BOARD OF TREASURY, INVESTMENT POLICY 
8 (July 28, 2016), www.wvtreasury.com/RFP-RFQ/FileId/5628 [https://perma.cc/48RH-LN9P] 
(“Any asset backed commercial paper with one of the two highest short term credit ratings by a 
NRSRO (e.g., rated A-1/P-1/F-1 or better).”); id. at 8–10 (relying on NRSRO ratings with respect to 
several categories of debt instruments, including corporate debt, mutual funds, and mortgage-
backed securities). Other states have similar provisions in their investment guidelines. See 
INVESTMENT POLICY: GENERAL PORTFOLIO, ST. OF NEV. OFF. OF THE ST. TREASURER 5–9 (Jun. 
2012), https://nevadatreasurer.gov/documents/investment/generalfund-investmentpolicy.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7SV6-2S4E]; STATE STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY, TREASURER OF ST. OF OHIO 
ST. TREASURY 1–9 (July 5, 2017). 
79. On March 29, 2016, the County of Los Angeles adopted an investment policy with a detailed 
schedule of minimum NRSRO ratings for various permitted investments, including corporate notes, 
asset backed-securities, and floating-rate notes. See TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR INVESTMENT 
POLICY, CTY. OF L.A. 15–17 (Mar. 29, 2016), https://ttc.lacounty.gov/Proptax/docs/Investment%20 
Policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ2G-YZWV]; see also id. at 10 (requiring that commercial paper 
be “‘of prime’ quality of the highest ranking or of the highest letter and number rating as provided 
for by a NRSRO”). 
80. On December 15, 2015, the City of Riverside, a municipality that suffered financial 
distressed due in part to the role of NRSROs during the financial crisis, adopted a Statement of 
Investment Policy that relied explicitly and mechanistically on NRSRO ratings. See City of El 
Cajon Investment Policy, CITY OF EL CAJON 5–6 (Sept. 2016), http://cityofelcajon.us/home/ 
showdocument?id=4836 [https://perma.cc/6KXY-5Z73] (requiring minimum NRSRO ratings for 
numerous categories of investments, including, for example, for asset-backed securities that 
“[p]urchases are limited to securities rated at least in the ‘AA’ category, or its equivalent, by a 
NRSRO”). 
81. As of January 1, 2017, the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission adopted an 
investment policy that relies explicitly and mechanistically on NRSRO ratings with respect to 
numerous investment types, including commercial paper. LOCAL AGENCY INVESTMENT 
GUIDELINES, CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N 14 (Jan. 1, 2007), http://www.treasurer. 
ca.gov/cdiac/LAIG/guideline.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5WG-GVCM] (requiring the “[h]ighest letter 
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pension funds.83 According to one recent survey of corporate treasury 
investment policy statements, explicit reliance on credit ratings by 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch actually increased after the financial crisis, 
and the vast majority of corporate treasury policies require a minimum 
rating of single-A.84 
Dodd-Frank was an attempt to undo the legacy of regulatory licenses, 
as shown by the efforts to change bank regulation described above. 
However, the attempt appears not to have changed the underlying 
economics or incentives of the major NRSROs. As noted above, scholars 
have found that the informational content of credit ratings declined after 
Dodd-Frank.85 It is difficult to isolate causality, and event-study analysis 
                                                     
and number rating” by an NRSRO); see also id. (requiring AA rating for mortgage-backed 
securities and an A rating for medium-term notes); UNION SANITARY DISTRICT POLICY: 
INVESTMENT POLICY, UNION CITY, CAL. (Jan. 1, 2017) https://www.unionsanitary.com/images/ 
documents/2030_Investment_Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5TQ-BFTQ] (adopting similar NRSRO-
related requirements). 
82. The University of Miami’s short-term investment policy relies explicitly on NRSRO ratings 
for several categories of investments, including corporate bonds (“[F]or maturities greater than one 
year, fixed and floating rate of at least A-/A3 or higher by at least one NRSRO”) and money-market 
instruments (“Investments must have a short-term rating of at least A-1/P-1 or the equivalent or a 
long-term rating of at least A-/A3 or the equivalent by at least one” NRSRO). SHORT-TERM 
INVESTMENT POLICY: WORKING CAPITAL, U. OF MIAMI (Oct. 2014) (adopting similar NRSRO-
related requirements). 
83. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System, known as CalPERS, actually 
increased its reliance on NRSRO ratings in late 2015, adding a provision limiting authorized 
CalPERS external credit rating agencies to Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, and adopting credit rating 
portfolio limits that mechanistically rely on those three NRSROs. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM: INVESTMENT POLICY FOR GLOBAL FIXED INCOME PROGRAM 6 
(Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/board-agendas/201511/invest/item06a-01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3JZ-S9JN] (“Credit Rating Portfolio Limits – The average credit quality of the 
Program’s portfolio shall be ‘single-A’ long-term credit rating designation (A2 by Moody’s, A by 
S&P and A by Fitch).”). 
84. See SHAPING INVESTMENT POLICIES FOR A SAFER CASH PORTFOLIO, CAP. ADVISORS GRP. 
(June 2012), https://capitaladvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Shaping-Investment-Policies-
for-a-Safer-Cash-Portfolio.pdf [https://perma.cc/D97M-DG28] (reporting that “there was a slight 
uptick in investment policies requiring a minimum credit rating of AA or AAA today versus in 
2009, although the vast majority of Capital Advisors Group’s clients continue to require a minimum 
rating of A”). 
85. See Dimitrov, Palia & Tang, supra note 30, at 429. Interestingly, some commentators have 
suggested that the reason credit ratings became less informative after Dodd-Frank was greater 
regulatory scrutiny. See id. If this suggestion were correct, additional increased regulatory costs, 
including costs arising from some of the proposals advanced in this Article, in particular relating to 
section 11 and Regulation FD, might risk making credit ratings less informative (and, conversely, 
that proposals here reducing regulatory costs might make credit ratings more informative). 
However, an alternative interpretation is that the recent declining informativeness of credit ratings 
was not caused by increased regulatory costs. In any event, as noted below, the Congressional 
proposals related to section 11 and Regulation FD arguably would generate socially valuable net 
results. 
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of the effects of credit rating reforms would be difficult.86 But one 
nevertheless can observe certain facts regarding the post-reform 
performance of the major credit rating agencies. Available metrics show 
strong financial performance of major credit rating agencies.87 
Moody’s is the only free-standing credit rating agency with publicly 
traded shares. From the 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers through 
January 2017, Moody’s common shares were up approximately 180%, 
compared to a roughly 81% gain for the S&P 500 during the same 
period.88 From July 21, 2010, when President Barack Obama signed 
Dodd-Frank, through January 2017, Moody’s shares gained about 355%, 
while the S&P 500 gained about 112%.89 As of January 2017, Moody’s 
market capitalization was nearly $20 billion.90 
Moody’s remarkable profitability sustains a massive organization. As 
of December 31, 2015, Moody’s maintained approximately 10,400 full-
time equivalent employees.91 At the same time, Moody’s operating 
margins were 42%.92 Moody’s operating margins were higher than those 
in any sector of the U.S. economy measured by financial economists, 
including the peer group Moody’s uses for purposes of benchmarking 
executive compensation.93 This performance is stunning. 
                                                     
86. Credit rating agency reforms do not have an obvious starting point. Moreover, most 
NRSROs are not publicly traded, and there is little public information about changes in their ratings 
or performance. Scholars have criticized event studies in areas that involve far more precision than 
would be possible studying credit rating agency reforms. See Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & 
Jonathan Klick, The Logic and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) (highlighting the limitations of event studies in securities 
litigation). 
87. In 2011, Moody’s and S&P each disclosed receiving more than one million dollars of ratings 
revenue per analyst. See S&P, Moody’s Boosting Rating Fees Faster Than Inflation, FIN. POST, 
(Nov. 15, 2011) http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/sp-moodys-boosting-rating-fees-
faster-than-inflation [https://perma.cc/4N9G-H3ZR]. 
88. On September 15, 2008, the closing price of MCO was 36.14 and the closing price of 
^GSPC was 1255.08; on January 20, 2017, these closing prices were 101.02 and 2,271.31, 
respectively. See YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/MCO/history?p=MCO 
[https://perma.cc/GUE5-9NCC]. 
89. On July 21, 2010, the closing price of MCO was 22.18 and the closing price of ^GSPC was 
1,069.59. See YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EGSPC/history?p=%5EGSPC 
[https://perma.cc/RNL3-RSVW]. 
90. See Moody’s Corporation, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/MCO?p=MCO 
[https://perma.cc/GUE5-9NCC] (showing $19.3 billion market capitalization as of January 21, 
2017). 
91. See Moody’s 2016 Form 10-K, supra note 27, at 14.  
92. See id. at 37. 
93. See NYU Global Datasets: Margins by Sector (US), N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS. (Jan. 2016), 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html [https://perma.cc/QD 
6R-NHNY]; Moody’s Corp., Schedule 14A Information 40 (Mar. 2, 2016); Mary Ellen Biery, These 
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S&P Global, Inc. (SPGI), the parent company of S&P Global Ratings, 
includes other businesses, making it difficult to isolate the performance 
of the ratings business. Nevertheless, it appears that S&P’s performance 
has been similar to that of Moody’s. SPGI had a market capitalization of 
approximately thirty billion dollars as of January 2017,94 and S&P 
Global Ratings contributed more than half of that parent’s operating 
profit during 2015.95 
Sophisticated investors recognize the oligopoly power and high profit 
margins associated with the credit rating industry, and they continue to 
maintain large ownership stakes of the major credit rating agencies.96 
Interestingly, there is some evidence that the ownership interests of 
credit rating agencies generate indirect benefits as well: one study has 
found that Moody’s ratings of bonds issued by firms that were important 
investees of its two significant shareholders (Berkshire Hathaway and 
Davis Selected Advisors) were more favorable than comparable ratings 
issued by S&P and Fitch.97 The same research also found that S&P had 
more favorable ratings of bonds issued by the owners of its parent, 
McGraw Hill.98 These findings suggest that reforms have not negatively 
impacted the credit rating business. 
The ongoing profitability and market value of Moody’s and S&P 
supports a conclusion that regulatory licenses have been sticky and 
persistent. The Dodd-Frank attempts at removal of regulatory references 
to NRSRO ratings have not changed the oligopolistic structure of the 
credit rating industry. Moody’s and S&P continue to dominate and 
profit, notwithstanding the continuing uninformative nature of their 
ratings. 
                                                     
Industries Generate the Highest Profit Margins, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2015), http://www.forbes.com 
/sites/sageworks/2015/09/06/these-industries-generate-the-highest-profit-margins/#6a4c52c264ac 
[https://perma.cc/J3TD-RX4R]. 
94. See S&P Global Inc., YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SPGI/?p=SPGI 
[https://perma.cc/983B-C8FR] ($30.1 billion market capitalization as of January 20, 2017). 
95. See S&P Global Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 12, 2016). 
96. For example, Berkshire Hathaway held 12.9% of Moody’s shares as of January 2017. See 
Moody’s Corporation, YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/MCO/holders?p=MCO 
[https://perma.cc/3V6A-GP3P]. 
97. See Simi Kedia, Shivaram Rajgopal, & Xing (Alex) Zhou, Large Shareholders and Credit 
Ratings, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author). 
98. See id. 
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II.  OVERSIGHT 
In addition to the Dodd-Frank provisions, attempting to remove 
regulatory licenses, the statute also included several new oversight 
provisions. Unfortunately, their effect has been minimal and in some 
cases counterproductive. The lack of oversight leaves credit rating 
agencies largely unchecked. 
A. The Office of Credit Ratings 
Dodd-Frank amended section 15E of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to enhance the regulation, oversight, and transparency of 
NRSROs.99 The most significant oversight change was a new office 
within the SEC: the Office of Credit Ratings. The OCR assists the SEC 
in its major goals—protecting investors; promoting capital formation; 
and maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets—by overseeing 
NRSROs.100 Section 932 of Dodd-Frank imposed new reporting, 
disclosure, and examination requirements on NRSROs and mandated 
that the OCR would implement them.101 
Since its creation in June 2012, the OCR has had broad responsibility 
for administering SEC rules, monitoring NRSRO practices, conducting 
compliance examinations, protecting users of credit ratings, promoting 
accuracy of credit ratings, monitoring conflicts of interest, and helping to 
ensure greater disclosure related to ratings.102 
As of early 2017, ten credit rating agencies were registered as 
NRSROs.103 Moody’s and S&P dominate the market; Fitch is also a 
significant player, but the other seven credit rating agencies are smaller 
and the OCR explicitly describes them as “smaller NRSRO[s].”104 
                                                     
99. See Dodd-Frank Act § 932. 
100. Some smaller credit rating firms are not NRSROs, but they are not significant from an 
economic or regulatory perspective. 
101. See id.  
102. See OFFICE OF CREDIT RATINGS, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/ocr [https://perma.cc/LLS4-
YKPP]. The OCR is located in New York and Washington, D.C. and is staffed with examiners, 
attorneys, and accountants with expertise in structured finance, corporate finance, municipal 
finance, financial institutions, insurance companies, and credit rating agencies. 
103. See id. (orders granting registration to A.M. Best Co., Inc.; DBRS, Inc.; Egan-Jones Rating 
Co.; Fitch Ratings, Inc.; HR Ratings de México, S.A. de C.V., Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.; 
Kroll Bond Rating Agency, Inc.; Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.; Morningstar Credit Ratings, 
LLC; and S&P Global Ratings Inc.). 
104. 2015 SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF EACH NATIONALLY 
RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION, SEC 8 (Dec. 2015) [hereinafter 2015 
SUMMARY REPORT]. 
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The OCR is required to examine each NRSRO at least annually under 
section 15E of the Exchange Act.105 Although the specific results are not 
publicly available, the OCR is required to produce an annual report 
summarizing its essential findings, along with summaries of any 
NRSRO responses to material regulatory deficiencies and whether the 
NRSROs have appropriately addressed the OCR’s recommendations.106 
B. OCR Findings 
The scholarly literature has not addressed OCR’s reporting, in part 
because, contrary to the transparency mandate of Dodd-Frank, the OCR 
does not identify which NRSRO was involved in each reported 
transgression. Instead, each violation is described only in general, often 
cryptic, terms, which do not permit the reader to identify which rating 
agency is involved.107 
For example, the OCR found that on “numerous occasions” one 
“larger” NRSRO—presumably meaning Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch—used 
inaccurate and incorrect ratings methodologies for both structured 
finance and residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) 
transactions.108 The NRSRO did not accurately code terms, and did not 
detect this coding mistake as part of its surveillance; the transaction was 
downgraded after the mistake was discovered. The mistakes resulted in 
“several” erroneous ratings.109 The OCR found that senior personnel 
changed ratings committee determinations in contravention of the 
NRSRO’s policies and procedures; as a result, this unnamed NRSRO 
misapplied its rating criteria.110 These are serious and surprising 
                                                     
105. See id. at 5 (enumerating eight topic areas of examination).  
106. Id. 
107. I requested the identity of rating agencies in the OCR’s reporting under the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), but the SEC’s FOIA office denied my request. The same individual acted 
as both FOIA Public Liaison, the designated person to assist with FOIA requests, and as FOIA 
Branch Chief, the person who denied my request. The SEC refused to produce information 
notwithstanding the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which states that information shall be 
withheld by regulators “only if the agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an 
interest protected by an exemption or disclosure is prohibited by law.” FOIA Improvement Act of 
2016, Pub. L. No. 114–85; see also OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-
act-2016 [https://perma.cc/L3TL-EJWB]. The SEC did not indicate if it made a determination that 
the disclosures I requested would “harm” a credit rating agency, or that it balanced any harm that 
might occur to one credit rating agency against the harm (or potential benefit) to another. 
108. See 2015 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 11–12. 
109. Id. at 12. 
110. Id.  
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allegations that resemble financial crisis-related findings that rating 
agencies made out-of-model upward adjustments for RMBS and CDO 
ratings.111 
Likewise, a different “larger” NRSRO assigned “several” ratings that 
differed from those generated by its own quantitative model without 
properly documenting the rationale for the adjustment.112 This NRSRO 
also failed to adhere to its internal policies and procedures with respect 
to the withdrawal of ratings. These failures related to financial institution 
ratings, again echoing the rating mistakes leading up to the financial 
crisis.113 
The OCR found that two larger NRSROs and one smaller NRSRO 
failed to adhere to their own policies and procedures regarding review 
and revision of rating methodologies, criteria, and models, and 
correction of errors.114 Analysts at one “larger” NRSRO learned of errors 
in a “substantial” number of third-party models used to determine ratings 
but did not analyze the impact of these errors, as required; the OCR 
further found substantive statements in this NRSRO’s internal rating 
records that directly contradicted its rating publications.115 Analysts at 
another “larger” NRSRO made inaccurate disclosures about its rating 
methodologies, and did not correct an error in calculations it used to 
determine certain ratings, or disclose the rating implications of this 
error.116 At two “larger” NRSROs, rating files contained inaccurate 
information or were missing required documents, including “the inputs 
to quantitative models used to determine the rating of structured finance 
securities.”117 
OCR found similar deficiencies with respect to conflicts of interest as 
well. OCR staff found evidence—including emails between sales 
employees, analytical managers, and senior management—indicating 
that a “larger” NRSRO had issued an unsolicited rating of an issuer in 
order to capture greater market share, in contravention of its own code of 
conduct.118 
                                                     
111. See John M. Griffin & Dragon Yongjun Tang, Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO Credit 
Ratings?, 67 J. FIN. 1293, 1307 (2009). 
112. See 2015 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 12. 
113. See Flannery, Houston & Partnoy, Viable Substitutes, supra note 31, at 2092. 
114. See 2015 SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 104, at 12. 
115. Id. at 13. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 14. 
118. Id. at 15. 
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In sum, NRSRO policies remain deeply flawed.119 OCR staff 
recommended remedial measures, but neither the NRSROs nor the 
involved officials were disciplined for any of these violations. 
Section 932(a) of Dodd-Frank requires that the OCR make its 
findings available to the public in “an easily understandable 
format . . . summarizing [its] essential findings.”120 Congress provided 
that the OCR investigations should be transparent. Yet the OCR hides 
the identity of the credit rating agencies it investigates. It is not possible 
to determine which NRSROs committed the various violations.121 
The OCR did name S&P in the settlement of three enforcement 
proceedings regarding mortgage-backed securities. The findings about 
S&P’s flawed assumptions, methodologies, and misstatements echo the 
financial crisis; they read as if nothing has changed since 2008.122 
However, the vast majority of the OCR’s reported transgressions do not 
name the wrongdoing agency. 
The SEC’s and OCR’s ongoing transparency failures are contrary to 
Dodd-Frank’s mandate that various information about credit ratings be 
published and made freely available on an easily accessible portion of 
each NRSRO’s website.123 They also are contrary to the SEC’s own 
2014 release implementing its new NRSRO rules, where it repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of making information about each agency 
easily accessible.124 Indeed, the SEC used the term “easily accessible” 
repeatedly throughout that release to describe how individual NRSROs 
should make information available on an internet website.125 In these 
instances, the SEC’s intention explicitly is to make it easier for investors 
to access specific information about individual NRSROs.126 
This Article’s oversight recommendation is straightforward. The OCR 
should follow Congress’s mandate and include the names of NRSROs in 
its findings. 
                                                     
119. Given that two of the “larger” three credit rating agencies were involved in this conduct, 
one can infer that these serious problems existed at either Moody’s or S&P, or both. 
120. Dodd-Frank Act § 932(p)(3)(C)(i). 
121. As noted above, the OCR does not specify which NRSRO committed each of the specified 
violations. 
122. See 2015 SUMMARY REPORT supra note 104, at 6–7.  
123. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)(2)(D) (2012). 
124. See National Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-72936, 109 SEC Docket 3429 (Oct. 14, 2014). 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
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C. Limitations on the OCR 
Even if the OCR referenced the names of individual rating agencies, 
its approach still faces limitations, the most serious being its utter lack of 
regulatory teeth. The OCR is merely an office within the SEC, not an 
independent, free-standing entity with the ability to bring enforcement 
actions. Although SEC officials, or federal prosecutors, could bring civil 
or criminal enforcement actions based on OCR findings, civil actions 
have been infrequent and criminal actions non-existent. 
Near the beginning of the 2009 Senate hearings on credit ratings, 
Senator Christopher Dodd, the co-author of Dodd-Frank, cited a white 
paper I wrote for the Council of Institutional Investors127 in which I 
advocated for an independent, free-standing office of credit rating 
agency oversight. Senator Dodd noted that one key element of the 
reforms I proposed was the creation of “a single independent credit 
rating agency oversight board,” similar to the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board for accounting (PCAOB).128 However, 
Congress declined to adopt this proposal. 
Housing the OCR within the SEC has proven to be a mistake. In 
recent years, the SEC has been hobbled by a massive workload in the 
aftermath of Dodd-Frank. Courts have criticized the SEC repeatedly on a 
range of issues related to its rulemakings and assessments.129 These 
criticisms do not necessarily apply to the OCR or its employees, but the 
OCR is subject to the SEC’s limitations. When the OCR uncovers 
serious misconduct, there is no mechanism for it to engage in any 
serious disciplinary action. 
Giving the OCR independent status would help resolve some of these 
issues. As William Bratton has noted, the model of delegating to an 
agency “works well only so long as the agency successfully resists 
capture by the interest of the actors it regulates.”130 Professor Bratton 
was writing about the PCAOB in 2003, but his words apply equally to 
the OCR in 2017. In addition to independence, the OCR needs the 
                                                     
127. Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor 
Perspective, (Council of Inst’l Investors, Research Paper No. 09-014, Apr. 2009). 
128. See Examining Proposals to Enhance the Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of Sen. Chris 
Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. On Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs.). 
129. See, e.g., Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 458 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that “plaintiffs have offered sufficient evidence from which a jury could 
infer that the ratings were both misleading and disbelieved by the Ratings Agencies when issued”). 
130. William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles 
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003). 
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ongoing ability and resources to engage in the same kind of meaningful 
oversight that has been envisioned for the PCAOB, and also the 
willingness to be more transparent by naming names in compliance with 
Dodd-Frank. 
III. ACCOUNTABILITY 
Scholars have considered the extent to which the threat of liability is a 
viable enforcement mechanism to promote efficiency and fairness in 
financial markets.131 Several commentators have addressed the extent to 
which “gatekeepers,” including credit rating agencies, should be subject 
to civil liability,132 and the limitations of reputation as a constraint.133 
This section contributes to this literature, focusing on Dodd-Frank 
credit rating accountability reforms relating to section 11 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Regulation FD). It also discusses recent litigation against the credit 
rating agencies. In each case, the degree of accountability for credit 
rating agencies remains low. Such limited accountability contributes to 
the credit rating agencies’ reluctance to address the major problems that 
contributed to the financial crisis. 
A. Legislation 
Dodd-Frank included several provisions designed to increase the 
accountability of credit rating agencies by removing the privileged 
treatment they had enjoyed under the securities laws. However, the SEC 
rejected these provisions and reinstated the privileges. 
                                                     
131. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691; John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the 
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 
(2006); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 
WIS. L. REV. 333; Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. S7 (1993).  
132. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy’s 
Complaint: A Response, 84 B.U. L. REV. 377 (2004); Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, 
Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 797 (2016); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper 
Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Alessio M. Pacces & Alessandro Romano, A Strict Liability 
Regime for Rating Agencies, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 673 (2015); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the 
Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001). 
133. See Jonathan Macey, The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment 
Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency), 22 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 18 
(2010); Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the Reputational Model in Capital Markets: The Problem 
of the “Last Period Parasites,” 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 432 (2010). 
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1. Section 11 
Perhaps the most significant accountability change in Dodd-Frank 
was repeal of Rule 436(g).134 Rule 436(g) previously insulated NRSROs 
from liability as experts under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
which provides for liability for misstatements (such as false credit 
ratings) that are included or incorporated by reference in a registration 
statement or prospectus. Specifically, Rule 436(g) exempted NRSRO 
credit ratings from being deemed part of a registration statement or 
prospectus.135 As a result, NRSROs were not considered experts subject 
to section 11. Credit rating agencies that were not NRSROs remained 
subject to such liability, though my research has not uncovered any cases 
in which a non-NRSRO credit rating agency has been subject to liability 
under section 11. 
The repeal of Rule 436(g) followed an October 2009 SEC concept 
release on credit ratings that included a similar repeal proposal.136 The 
concept release made it clear that repeal of Rule 436(g) would 
significantly increase the liability risks of NRSROs.137 However, the 
SEC did not act on its concept release. In passing Dodd-Frank, Congress 
effectively made the SEC’s concept release law, eliminating the 
differential treatment of NRSROs and non-NRSROs under section 11. 
During the debate about the SEC’s concept release and Dodd-Frank’s 
accountability provisions, NRSROs threatened to stop providing ratings 
if they were subject to liability as experts under section 11.138 
After the passage of Dodd-Frank, the NRSROs followed through on 
their threats. They refused to provide consents with respect to new issues 
of investment-grade debt and asset-backed securities.139 As a result, 
some companies publicly stated that they would be unable to raise 
                                                     
134. See Dodd-Frank Act § 939G. 
135. 17 C.F.R. 220.436(g) (2016). 
136. Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) under the Securities Act of 1933, 
Release Nos. 33-9071, 34-60798, 96 SEC Docket 2719 (Oct. 7, 2009). 
137. See id. at 3–4 (“Rescinding the exemption would cause NRSROs to be included in the 
liability scheme for experts set forth in Section 11, as is currently the case for credit rating agencies 
that are not NRSROs.”); id. at 16 (noting “we believe that rescinding Rule 436(g), and therefore 
potentially increasing the risk of liability under the federal securities laws, could significantly 
improve investor protection”). 
138. See Danielle Carbone, The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Credit Rating Agency Reform 
on Public Companies, 24 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. LAW ADVISOR 1, 1 (2010). 
139. See id. at 2. 
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capital in offerings registered under the Securities Act. The repeal of 
Rule 436(g) immediately became a game of credit ratings chicken.140 
The SEC blinked first. On July 22, 2010, the SEC’s the Division of 
Corporation Finance issued a “no-action” letter to Ford Motor Credit 
Company LLC and Ford Credit Auto Receivables Two LLC, permitting 
them to omit credit ratings disclosure from a prospectus.141 The relief 
was temporary (it was scheduled to expire on January 24, 2011), but the 
SEC subsequently cemented the relief, making it clear that NRSROs 
would not be subject to liability under section 11.142 
This regulatory response to Dodd-Frank’s elimination of Rule 436(g) 
was extraordinary.143 Essentially, the SEC refused to implement 
Congress’s intent, and said so explicitly. The SEC’s action was not 
without a rationale: the SEC publicly expressed a concern that certain 
parts of the asset-backed securities markets would not properly function 
if the SEC implemented the Dodd-Frank mandate.144 It is unclear 
whether those markets in fact would not have properly functioned, or 
whether the markets might have been transformed in ways that would 
have been fairer and more efficient. Nevertheless, the SEC flouted the 
obvious intent of Congress. As of early 2017, Congress had not reacted. 
And perhaps surprisingly, no investors or other plaintiffs have sued to 
challenge the SEC. 
It remains unclear what might happen if NRSROs were subject to 
section 11 liability. One possibility is that certain markets, such as asset-
backed securities, would contract. Another possibility is that some rating 
agencies might be willing to consent to include their credit rating in a 
prospectus or registration statement. It is unclear whether the resulting 
competition would be a race to the top or bottom, though it would more 
closely resemble the reputational capital view of rating agencies. The 
fact that NRSROs are not willing to play such a role supports the view 
that they continue to act as regulatory license providers, instead of 
information intermediaries. 
In any event, the Rule 436(g) episode illustrates the stickiness 
problem associated with a privatized regulatory function. Congress 
                                                     
140. See id. 
141. See id.  
142. See id.  
143. See id. (describing the SEC’s quick actions to restart the markets, including the issuance of 
a no-action letter, discussions with major Wall Street law firms, and website postings to clarify its 
interpretation, all within days). 
144. See Dodd-Frank Act § 939G; Concept Release on Possible Rescission of Rule 436(g) under 
the Securities Act of 1933, Release Nos. 33-9071, 34-60798, 96 SEC Docket 2719 (Oct. 7, 2009). 
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passed a law governing both regulators and private actors. Private actors 
refused to comply with the law. Regulators acceded to the private actors’ 
demands. And then, Congress did nothing in response. Although the 
direction of government power typically flows from legislators to 
regulators and then in the direction of private actors, in this case the 
power moved in the opposite direction, with private actors dictating to 
regulators that both of them would ignore the express will of the 
legislature. 
In practical terms, the result of the SEC’s rule providing that ratings 
are not considered a part of a registration statement is that credit rating 
agencies need not be concerned about a “due diligence” defense. To 
satisfy the defense, an agency would have needed to show that “after 
reasonable investigation, [it had] reasonable ground to believe and did 
believe . . . that the [credit ratings] therein were true and that there was 
no omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or 
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.”145 Effectively, 
the SEC has signaled to NRSROs that such reasonable grounds are not 
necessary. Accordingly, there is no need for rating agency due diligence. 
Because of the SEC’s munificence, the credit rating agencies cannot be 
liable as experts under section 11, even though Dodd-Frank clearly 
provides that they should be. Given these changes, it is not surprising 
that the informational value of credit ratings would decline after 
Dodd-Frank. 
2. Regulation FD 
The Dodd-Frank provisions related to Regulation FD also illustrate 
the stickiness of regulators’ reliance on credit rating agencies. Section 
939B of Dodd-Frank required that the SEC revise Regulation FD to 
remove the exemption for entities whose primary business is credit 
ratings.146 Regulation FD provides that when an issuer privately 
discloses material nonpublic information to certain persons, the issuer 
must also publicly disclose that information.147 Regulation FD was 
promulgated in 2000 to address the problem of “selective disclosure,” 
when issuers privately disclosed information in circumstances that 
                                                     
145. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (2012). 
146. Dodd-Frank Act § 939B. 
147. Regulation FD prohibits covered issuers from selectively disclosing to four categories of 
persons: (i) broker-dealers and their associated persons, (ii) investment advisers and institutional 
investment managers and their associated persons, (iii) investment companies and their associated 
persons, and (iv) holders of the issuer’s securities, under circumstances in which it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the holder will trade on the information. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016). 
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created unfair advantages for certain persons, including advantages those 
persons might gain by trading securities or providing advice based on 
the information.148 
During and before the financial crisis, Regulation FD had explicitly 
exempted credit rating agencies.149 As a result, issuers were free to 
disclose nonpublic information to credit rating agency employees, who 
could then use that information in their rating evaluations. The 
exemption arguably gave credit rating agencies a significant market 
advantage not available to other institutions and individuals who could 
only obtain public information. 
In the aftermath of the collapse of Enron, it became apparent that 
although the credit rating agencies frequently received inside 
information, they often did not use that information or reflect it in their 
ratings. Critics argued that the credit rating agencies should not be 
entitled to an exemption from Regulation FD.150 Congress heard 
evidence about Regulation FD and the credit rating agencies, but 
decided in its 2006 legislation to leave the exemption intact.151 
The legislative history of Dodd-Frank reflects arguments about 
removing the Regulation FD exemption for credit rating agencies. The 
SEC conducted a Roundtable on Issues Related to the Oversight of 
Credit Rating Agencies on April 15, 2009, and experts submitted 
evidence about the likely effects of removing the exemption.152 This 
Roundtable framed the later debates about the Regulation FD exemption. 
                                                     
148. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7881, 
51719 (2000), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm [https://perma.cc/U7ZV-DACP]. 
149. See id. 
150. See FRANK PARTNOY, RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 13 (2009) (submitted as an exhibit as part of the SEC Roundtable); Frank 
Partnoy, Statement to the SEC Roundtable on Issues Related to the Oversight of Credit Rating 
Agencies (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cra-oversight-roundtable/cra-oversight-
roundtable-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/EK4X-NE2Z]. 
151. The major credit rating agencies, particularly S&P, actively lobbied Congress during the 
debate about this legislation. When I testified before the House of Representatives, numerous S&P 
managers were seated behind me, including S&P’s prominent First Amendment attorney, Floyd 
Abrams, who was present, not to testify, but because members of Congress and their staffs knew his 
reputation. See Legislative Solutions for The Rating Agency Duopoly: Hearing Before the H. 
Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 109th Cong. 
(2005) (statement of Frank Partnoy).  
152. See PARTNOY, RETHINKING REGULATION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, supra note 150, at 
13 (submitted as an exhibit as part of the SEC Roundtable); Partnoy, Statement to the SEC 
Roundtable on Issues Related to the Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies, supra note 150 (noting 
that “Congress already has begun debating the extent to which the rating agencies should be held 
accountable as gatekeepers, and courts have recognized the errors in previous cases. Rating agencies 
should not be exempt from securities fraud liability, and they should not enjoy any special privilege 
over other gatekeepers in Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, Regulation FD, or elsewhere”). 
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By 2010, public and congressional sentiment about the credit rating 
agencies was obviously less favorable than it had been during previous 
years, and it became apparent that Dodd-Frank would include numerous 
accountability provisions. In a savvy pivot, the credit rating agencies did 
not fight the immediate efforts to remove the Regulation FD exemption; 
instead, they began playing a longer game. In retrospect, the credit rating 
agencies’ long-term strategy is apparent from the Congressional 
testimony regarding Regulation FD during the Dodd-Frank hearings. 
Regulation FD was not covered extensively during the Dodd-Frank 
hearings, so it is worth setting forth the testimony related to Dodd-Frank 
section 939B in its entirety.153 
At one point during the hearings, Representative Jackie Speier of 
California questioned the CEOs of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch (Deven 
Sharma, Raymond W. McDaniel, and Stephen W. Joynt, 
respectively).154 Representative Speier asked generally about how the 
credit rating agencies would function if they no longer had access to 
selective disclosure of inside information by issuers. 
Ms. SPEIER. There is a regulation FD that the agencies contend 
that the exemption is needed in order to fully evaluate credit 
risk. Most notoriously, even though Enron made nonpublic 
credit rating agency presentations, information about the risk 
described in those presentations was not reflected in Enron’s 
credit ratings. So my question is, if we are talking about 
accountability, if we are talking about greater disclosure, why 
should you be eligible for this exemption from regulation FD? 
Mr. MCDANIEL. We operated for 90 years before regulation FD 
became effective. I think we were able to do a very fine job 
during that period, and I think we would be able to operate 
without regulation FD exemption now. 
Ms. SPEIER. Thank you. 
Mr. Sharma? 
Mr. SHARMA. Ratings are forward looking, and information that 
allows us—that gives us more insight as to the future helps us to 
make better decisions. 
Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Joynt? 
                                                     
153. There is only one reference to Regulation FD in the legislative history of Dodd-Frank. See 
Rick McKinney, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act: A Brief 
Legislative History, LLSDC (July 29, 2015), http://www.llsdc.org/dodd-frank-legislative-history 
[https://perma.cc/23YY-2ENK]. 
154. Reforming Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cap. Mkts., Ins., and 
Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 38 (2009).  
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
2017] WHAT’S (STILL) WRONG WITH CREDIT RATINGS? 1439 
 
Mr. JOYNT. I would agree. I think that regulation was passed to 
allow issuers to more freely communicate with rating agencies 
so they can make better decisions. 
Ms. SPEIER. But we have lots of examples where it wasn’t used 
in that way. So the question is, is it going to hurt your business if 
we get rid of that exemption? 
Mr. JOYNT. I believe we could continue to offer educated 
opinions.155 
The CEOs’ responses suggest there would not be negative 
consequences to Congress removing the Regulation FD exemption. The 
implication of their answers was that the rating agencies could function 
well without access to inside information from issuers. However, 
consider what happened next, after Dodd-Frank passed. 
The credit rating agencies immediately lobbied the SEC to make it 
clear in its release implementing section 939B that issuers submitting 
material nonpublic information to NRSROs solely for the purpose of 
obtaining credit ratings would not violate Regulation FD.156 Specifically, 
the particular regulation at issue, Rule 100(b)(2)(iii), provided that the 
Regulation FD requirement to disclose information publicly would not 
be triggered if a selective disclosure was made to an NRSRO.157 The 
credit rating agencies wanted the SEC to make it clear that issuers did 
not need to worry about the removal of this provision because there still 
would be other bases for issuers to selectively disclose inside 
information to NRSROs. In other words, the credit rating agencies were 
asking for the SEC to declare section 939B of Dodd-Frank a nullity. 
The SEC gave the credit rating agencies what they had lobbied for. In 
its release implementing section 939B, the SEC deleted Rule 
100(b)(2)(iii), the provision exempting NRSROs. However, the SEC 
also set forth a roadmap for the credit rating agencies to continue to 
receive selective disclosures of material non-public information, in a 
footnote of the implementing release.158 Essentially, the suggestion was 
                                                     
155. Id. 
156. See Letter from Vickie A. Tillman, Exec. Vice President, Standard and Poor’s Inv. Ratings 
Servs., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 26, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-04-09/s70409-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNE4-TX3D]; Letter from 
Michel Madelain, Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors Serv., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-04-09/s70409-
20.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2ED-CASE]. 
157. 17 C.F.R. 243.100(b)(2)(iii) (2016). 
158. Footnote 9 stated:  
Regulation FD also provides exemptions for communications made to a person who owes 
the issuer a duty of trust or confidence—i.e., a “temporary insider”—such as an attorney, 
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that NRSROs could claim exemption as temporary insiders, like 
attorneys, investment bankers, and accountants, who remained exempt 
from Regulation FD. Note that the SEC accepted the opposite argument 
with respect to section 11 liability: there, attorneys, investment bankers, 
and accountants are subject to liability, but NRSROs are not. 
Subsequently, the leading credit rating agencies assured issuers that, 
notwithstanding the regulatory changes, issuers could continue to 
disclose inside information to NRSROs.159 Law firms advising issuers 
opined that the changes in Regulation FD would have little or no impact 
on selective disclosures made to credit rating agencies.160 One prominent 
law firm suggested that the SEC’s actions—and the rating agencies’ 
positions—were potentially contrary to Congressional intent, warning: 
Much ado about nothing? Perhaps. However, the directive to the 
SEC to remove the rating agency exemption may well evidence 
an intent by the legislators to require the public disclosure of 
material nonpublic information provided to the rating agencies 
in certain circumstances. It is uncertain whether Congress will 
be satisfied by the mere repeal of Rule 100(b)(2)(iii) and the 
continuation of business as usual.161 
In any event, business continued as usual. The changes to Regulation 
FD had no impact on NRSROs, for at least three reasons. First, the 
NRSROs maintained that the new rules did not cover them. Specifically, 
they argued that NRSROs did not fall within any of the specified 
categories of persons to whom selective disclosure was prohibited.162 
                                                     
investment banker, or accountant . . . , to any person who expressly agrees to maintain the 
information in confidence . . . , and in connection with most offerings of securities registered 
under the Securities Act . . . .These exemptions are unaffected by the Act.  
Removal from Regulation FD of the Exemption for Credit Rating Agencies, Exchange Act Release 
No. 33-9146, 34-63003, 99 SEC Docket 1503, n.9 (Sept. 29, 2010). 
159. According to one law firm advising issuers:  
The NRSROs that have publicly addressed the issue do not believe that the removal of the 
exemption will affect the way in which issuers share material nonpublic information with the 
rating agencies as part of the ratings process. In this regard, they do not believe that they fall 
within any of the enumerated categories of persons to whom selective disclosure is prohibited 
and their policies prohibit trading on material nonpublic information. In addition, the 
engagement letter that the rating agency enters into with the issuer contains confidentiality 
provisions which should allay concerns that companies may nonetheless have about the effect 
of the removal of the exemption. 
Carbone, supra note 138, at 5. 
160. See id. (relying on exemption for disclosures made in confidence). 
161. Janette A. McMahan & Kelly A. Schell, Much Ado About Nothing?, KIRKLAND ALERT 2 
(Oct. 2010). 
162. Id. 
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Second, the NRSROs contracted around the Dodd-Frank Regulation 
FD provisions: they changed their internal policies regarding trading 
based on material nonpublic information and the handling of 
confidential information to match the language in the extant Regulation 
FD exceptions.163 In other words, the rating agencies could not change 
the language of Dodd-Frank, so they changed their own practices to 
remove themselves from application of that language. 
Third, given the dearth of SEC’s actions based on Regulation FD, an 
economically rational NRSRO and the relevant issuer had little to fear 
from the selective disclosure of information by issuers, notwithstanding 
the limitations in Dodd-Frank. My research has not uncovered any 
challenges by the SEC to NRSRO practices regarding Regulation FD.164 
The machinations surrounding Regulation FD are another troubling 
example of the stickiness of regulatory reliance of private actors. The 
initial market failure, the informational asymmetry between issuers and 
investors, was exacerbated by the regulatory failure (exempting credit 
rating agencies from disclosure provisions), which was exacerbated by 
further market failure (lobbying by the focused interests of the 
NRSROs), which was worsened by further regulatory failure (the SEC 
ignoring the will of Congress, and then Congress not responding). 
B. Litigation 
Dodd-Frank also included reforms related to potential securities 
litigation against credit rating agencies. Those reforms included a 
statement that the enforcement, mental state, and forward-looking 
statement provisions of the securities law apply to credit rating agencies 
in the same manner and to the same extent as they apply to registered 
public accounting firms or securities analysts.165 This Article next 
considers accountability through litigation. 
In general, the courts have played only a limited role in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis.166 Only a handful of private cases were brought 
against credit rating agencies in response to losses sustained by investors 
                                                     
163. See, e.g., Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Fitch Comments on U.S. Financial Reform Act’s 
Implication for Credit Rating Agencies (July 19, 2010), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home 
/20100719006158/en/Fitch-Comments-U.S.-Financial-Reform-Acts-Implication [https://perma.cc/V 
7WE-7VGD] (“To the greatest extent possible, Fitch will work with the issuer community to put in 
place appropriate mechanisms so that Fitch can continue to receive confidential information as part 
of the rating process.”). 
164. The OCR’s annual reporting does not mention any such actions. 
165. See Dodd-Frank § 933. 
166. See generally David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014). 
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
1442 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1407 
 
during the financial crisis. Moreover, post-Dodd-Frank, there have been 
no major cases filed against the major rating agencies.167 
Moody’s has included disclosure about litigation arising out of the 
financial crisis in its annual securities filings, including some detail 
about these cases.168 Each resulted in significant settlements.169 
However, each also illustrates why credit rating agencies are unlikely to 
be held accountable through litigation in the future.170 
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.171 involved 
allegations related to a 2005 “structured investment vehicle” (SIV) 
called Cheyne Finance.172 Documents in the case showed that the 
individuals involved in structuring and selling the Cheyne transactions 
did not follow any rational or established methodology to arrive at the 
high ratings. For example, S&P’s lead analyst wrote in an e-mail to a 
colleague that “I had difficulties explaining ‘HOW’ we got to those 
numbers since there is no science behind it”; likewise, the lead analyst at 
Moody’s stated that there was “no actual data backing the current model 
assumptions” for Cheyne.173 In one instance, a Morgan Stanley 
executive effectively pressured S&P to raise its rating on a portion of the 
Cheyne debt from BBB to single-A.174 
The rating agencies had argued in past cases that their ratings were 
merely opinions and were protected as free speech.175 Scholars have 
criticized this argument, but the rating agencies have pressed it and 
won—both in the courts and in the media.176 Judge Scheindlin in Abu 
                                                     
167. As of early 2017, neither Moody’s nor S&P had publicly disclosed more recent litigation in 
their securities filings. 
168. See Moody’s 2016 Form 10-K, supra note 27, at 27, 44, 105–06.  
169. Id. 
170. There also have been a few cases outside the U.S. involving credit rating agencies. For 
example, Australian courts have found S&P liable for issuing misleading AAA ratings of complex 
structured products. See ABN AMRO Bank NV v Bathurst Regional Council [2014] FCR 65 (Austl.). 
171. 888 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). I acted as a consulting attorney for plaintiffs in this 
case. 
172. Id. at 440–41. 
173. Jeannett Neumann, Cost of Ratings Suit: $225 Million, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 29, 2013) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323528404578453292918428224 
[https://perma.cc/B47X-BDSB]; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Court Papers Undercut Ratings 
Agency Defense, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at B1.  
174. See Morgenson, supra note 173. 
175. Some U.S. courts previously had found that credit ratings were protected speech. See, e.g., 
Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 852–56 (10th Cir. 1999); In 
re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 819–27 (S.D. Tex. 2005).  
176. See Caleb Deats, Note, Talk that Isn’t Cheap: Does the First Amendment Protect Credit 
Rating Agencies’ Faulty Methodologies from Regulation?, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1818 (2010); Nan 
S. Ellis et al., Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies a Good Idea?: Credit Rating Agency 
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Dhabi held that the ratings were properly alleged to have been 
actionable misrepresentations, not opinions,177 but suggested that the 
First Amendment might have protected the rating agencies if the ratings 
had been widely disseminated and therefore were considered matters of 
public concern.178 The case ultimately settled for a reported $225 
million.179 
A second SIV-related case, California Public Employees Retirement 
System v. Moody’s Corp.,180 was filed in state court in California by 
CalPERS in 2009. That litigation involved similar claims and First 
Amendment arguments to Abu Dhabi, and also was protracted and 
costly;181 S&P settled the case for $125 million in early 2015, and 
Moody’s for $130 million in March 2016, on the eve of trial.182 
The most significant financial crisis case involving rating agencies 
was the $1.375 billion settlement of a 2013 civil complaint brought by 
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and nineteen states against S&P.183 
                                                     
Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 175, 221–22 
(2012); Partnoy, supra note 13, at 61. Other scholars have argued that imposing liability on credit 
rating agencies could be counterproductive, in part because liability could lead credit rating 
agencies to give ratings that were suboptimally low. See Dimitrov et al., supra note 30, at 513–14; 
Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Credit Ratings and Litigation Risk, at 1 (Mar. 15, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1787206 [https://perma.cc/HAU7-TPXS].  
177. See Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 454 
(S.D.N.Y 2012). 
178. See id. at 175. 
179. See Susan Beck, Susan Beck’s Summary Judgment: Blowback for the Rating Agencies, THE 
LITIG. DAILY (May 8, 2013), https://advance.lexis.com/search?crid=eed6d6c9-d21e-4e5c-866e-d 
10f362b6277&pdsearchterms=LNSDUID-ALM-AMLAWR-1202599298421&pdbypasscitatordocs 
=False&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true [https://perma.cc/8KU6-DT7G] (describing $225 
million settlement); Alison Frankel, Will CDO Investors’ Deal Boost Litigation Against Rating 
Agencies?, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS170095852220130429 
[https://perma.cc/5G2Q-CSFE]; Matt Taibbi, The Last Mystery of the Financial Crisis, ROLLING 
STONE (June 19, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-last-mystery-of-the-
financial-crisis-20130619 [https://perma.cc/DVA9-FGAR] (describing $225 million settlement). 
180. No. CGC-09-490241, 2010 WL 2286924 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 24, 2010). 
181. See Moody’s 2016 Form 10-K, supra note 27, at 106. 
182. See Joel Rosenblatt & Matt Scully, Moody’s Settles Calpers Ratings Lawsuit for $130 
Million, BLOOMBERGTECHNOLOGY (Mar. 9, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles 
/2016-03-09/calpers-says-moody-s-to-pay-130-million-to-settle-ratings-case [https://perma.cc/WX 
D4-LZVD]. The only other lawsuit Moody’s deemed sufficiently material to disclose was a 2008 
claim by Pursuit Partners arising out of the sale by UBS of five CDOs; that case was litigated for 
seven years until it settled, confidentially, during jury selection before trial. Alleged damages had 
been $44 million. See Moody’s 2016 Form 10-K, supra note 27, at 106–07. 
183. See Press Release, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder, Justice Department and 
State Partners Secure $1.375 Billion Settlement with S&P for Defrauding Investors in the Lead Up 
to the Financial Crisis, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-and-state-partners-secure-1375-billion-settlement-sp-defrauding-investors 
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That case alleged violations of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), a novel theory.184 
The DOJ alleged that S&P had made numerous fraudulent 
misrepresentations, including representations regarding the 
independence of S&P ratings of several RMBS and CDOs.185 S&P did 
not admit wrongdoing, though it was required to retract its earlier 
assertion that the lawsuit was political retaliation for the firm’s 2011 
downgrade of the United States’s credit rating.186 
On January 13, 2017, during the final week of the Obama 
administration, Moody settled similar FIRREA charges related to 
structured finance ratings with the DOJ and states’ attorneys general for 
$864 million.187 The agreement lacked the public findings of the case 
against S&P (or even a complaint).188 In announcing the settlement, 
Moody’s emphasized that it “stands behind the integrity of its ratings, 
methodologies and processes, and the settlement contains no finding of 
any violation of law, nor any admission of liability.”189 
Overall, the litigation against the credit rating agencies sends a mixed 
message regarding accountability. On one hand, the credit rating 
agencies paid substantial sums to settle a handful of cases. On the other 
hand, those cases were challenging and expensive to prosecute, and to 
some extent were successful due to their uniqueness. 
Importantly, the credit rating agencies’ First Amendment arguments 
remain an obstacle to future litigation. Given recent cases, the extent to 
which courts will regard credit ratings as merely commercial activity as 
opposed to statements of opinion about matters of public importance 
remains unclear. In section 931 of Dodd-Frank, Congress expressed 
some skepticism about the credit rating agencies’ free speech assertions 
and defenses. Section 931(2) states that credit rating agencies play a 
“gatekeeper” role in the debt market that “is functionally similar to that 
of securities analysts.”190 Implicit in that statement is an understanding 
that the “opinions” of securities analysts are subject to extensive 
regulation and are not considered protected speech, and credit rating 
agencies’ “opinions” are similar and should be treated similarly. 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/9TCK-MQGD]. 
184. See 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (2012). 
185. Id. 
186. See Press Release, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder, supra note 183. 
187. Id. 
188. Moody’s Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exhibit 99.1 (Jan. 13, 2017).  
189. See id. 
190. Dodd-Frank Act § 929-Z. 
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Congress also found that “the activities of credit rating agencies are 
fundamentally commercial in character and should be subject to the 
same standards of liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities 
analysts, and investment bankers.”191 However, based on the rulings in 
the above cases, the possibility of a free speech defense appears to 
remain, depending on the facts. 
Considering both the legislative reforms in Dodd-Frank and the 
judicial approaches to the small number of cases against credit rating 
agencies, there is only limited accountability for credit rating agencies. 
Given the limitations associated with both oversight and accountability, 
the next question is how the rating agency methodologies compare to 
those that were central to the financial crisis. 
IV. METHODOLOGIES 
This section will focus on several methodological areas that are 
arguably the most important from a policy perspective and that in any 
event have received considerable attention from the credit rating 
agencies themselves. This section will address approaches at both S&P 
and Moody’s. The serious methodological flaws described in this section 
are strong evidence of why credit ratings continue to have little 
informational value. The flaws documented here also illustrate why the 
stickiness of reliance on credit rating agencies is problematic, and why 
institutions should not continue to rely substantially on credit ratings. 
The credit rating agencies’ methodologies have not responded in any 
meaningful way to the major problems that contributed to the financial 
crisis. 
One of the central methodological problems with credit ratings has 
been credit rating agencies’ assessment of arbitrary distinctions, often 
with subjective adjustments to account for errors that arise from the 
arbitrary process. Scholars have recognized the pervasive nature of such 
methodological problems with respect to the mortgage-related debt 
instruments at the core of the recent financial crisis.192 Unfortunately, 
those methodological problems continue, even after the various reforms, 
and they are not limited to mortgage-related debt instruments. 
Instead of recognizing that credit risks, and the underlying factors that 
drive credit risks, involve the complex interactions of various financial 
and human variables, credit rating agency methodologies continue to 
rely on the simplistic categorization and addition of numerical 
                                                     
191. Id.  
192. See Griffin & Tang, supra note 111, at 1294. 
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assessments in different, overlapping categories. The methodologies do 
not resemble those used by sophisticated market participants and 
intermediaries who assess credit risk. Instead, the rankings within 
categories—and often the categories themselves—are overly-simplistic 
and arbitrary. The section begins the analysis with S&P’s corporate 
rating methodology. 
A. An Overview of Corporate Rating Methodology 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, S&P revised its 
methodological approach to corporate ratings. The literature has not 
assessed this new methodology in any detail. This section considers 
S&P’s revised approach. 
S&P’s revised methodological approach involves the serial 
assessment of several factors: (1) business risk, (2) financial risk, (3) 
anchor, and (4) modification.193 First, S&P determines a company’s 
business risk profile by analyzing its country risk, industry risk, and 
competitive position.194 Second, S&P determines a company’s financial 
risk profile by analyzing its cash flow and leverage.195 Third, S&P 
determines its ratings “anchor” by combining the business and financial 
risk profiles. Finally, S&P looks at six other factors that can lead to 
adjustments to the anchor.196 The four-step methodology has the 
appearance of some analytical precision, at least in separating various 
questions relevant to determinations of credit risk. However, a closer 
look at each step reveals the arbitrary nature of S&P’s revised 
methodology. 
1. Business Risk 
Business risk is composed of three sub-factors.197 The methodology 
for translating each of the three business risk sub-factor six-point ratings 
into the overall business risk six-point rating resembles a Russian 
nesting doll. First, S&P calculates two of the underlying business risk 
factors—country risk and industry risk—and then combines them based 
on the following grid to obtained a “Corporate Industry and Country 
                                                     
193. See STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., CORPORATE METHODOLOGY 3 (2013) 
[hereinafter S&P’S, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY]. 
194. Id. at 3–4. 
195. Id. at 5. 
196. Id.  
197. Id. at 6–8. 
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Risk Assessment” (CICRA).198 The grid is set forth below (the columns 
are the Country Risk Assessment; the rows are the Industry Risk 
Assessment): 
 
Country 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 
 2 2 2 2 3 4 5 
Industry 3 3 3 3 3 4 6 
 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 
 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 
 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Table 1:  
Determination of “CICRA” 
 
Note the bizarre normative judgments S&P has made in this grid. The 
country risk assessment is irrelevant to the CICRA so long as the 
country is in the first three categories of risk (meaning that the industry 
risk numbers remain constant regardless of the country risk rating). But 
once the country risk assessment falls to 5 or 6, the CICRA plummets.199 
S&P does not point to any data or research that supports such a sharp 
and discontinuous decline. One typically would expect an explanation 
for such a decline to be presented within the published methodology, but 
it is not. It is unclear the extent to which these mappings are based on 
historical assessments that might not hold into the future. The bases for 
the mappings are not transparent. 
Moreover, S&P’s underlying country risk assessment sub-categories 
are based on factors that would not support the grid’s implicit 
adjustments. Indeed, S&P asserts that it engaged in extensive review and 
testing in order to determine that each of the four sub-factors that are 
relevant to determining the Country Risk Assessment should be equally 
weighted.200 An equal weighting of sub-factors—each of which is, in 
turn, rating on a six-point scale—would be inconsistent with the 
discontinuous mappings in the above grid. S&P also includes numerous 
caveats and exceptions in its sub-factor assessments; to the extent the 
                                                     
198. Id. at 6. 
199. S&P’S, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 7 tbl.1. 
200. See STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., COUNTRY RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
AND ASSUMPTIONS 7 (2013). 
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sub-factors were assessed correctly, the discontinuities in the above grid 
should not have been necessary.201 
Next, S&P determines a company’s “competitive risk assessment.” 
This determination requires a trip down yet another credit-related rabbit 
hole. A company’s “competitive risk assessment” includes numerous 
subjective judgments about four sub-factors: the company’s competitive 
advantage; scale, scope, and diversity; operating efficiency; and 
profitability.202 The competitive risk assessment is made on yet another 
arbitrary six-point scale—excellent, strong, satisfactory, fair, weak, and 
vulnerable—with each of the first three sub-factors receiving a 
weighting and a ranking on a separate five-point scale.203 
Each company is put into one of six groups called “Competitive 
Position Group Profiles” (CPGP): “services and product focus;” 
“product focus/scale driven;” “capital or asset focus;” “commodity 
focus/cost driven;” “commodity focus/scale driven;” or “national 
industries and utilities.”204 The category matters a great deal. The 
“competitive advantage” sub-factor has only a 10% weighting in the 
“commodity focus/cost driven” group, but a 60% weighting in the 
“national industries and utilities” group. The “operating efficiency” sub-
factor has a 15% weighting in the “product focus/scale driven” group, 
but a 40% weighting in the “capital or asset focus” group. 
S&P admits that the judgments made as part of this assessment are 
“qualitative.”205 But a close examination of the details reveals just how 
nonsensical its qualitative assessment is. S&P provides a four-page 
appendix to its methodology including the mappings between various 
industry categories and subsectors and their corresponding CPGP.206 The 
categorizations are baffling. A company in “paper packaging” is grouped 
with airlines, technology distributors, semiconductors, film and TV 
                                                     
201. See id. (“After extensive review and testing, we have concluded that an equal weighting of 
the four sub-factors is the most representative approach to country risk. While the risk profiles in 
some countries might temporarily suggest a different weighting (such as when domestic hostilities 
break out or a banking crisis is under way), we did not find any one risk more determinant than 
others over time for the majority of countries. Still, to recognize the importance and potential for 
periodic sharp hikes in one type of risk, we introduced judgmental weighting on a case-by-case 
basis (per paragraph 49, we may round a country risk assessment weaker in case of ‘One type of 
risk being or becoming dominant that would cause us to add additional weight to an unfavorable 
sub-factor and reduce weight to a more favorable sub-factor(s).’”). 
202. See S&P’s, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 15. 
203. Id. at 16. 
204. Id. at 23. 
205. Id. at 15. 
206. See id. at 54–57. 
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programming production, fiber-optic carriers, and offshore contract 
drilling (all “capital or asset focus”), whereas a company in “paper 
products” is grouped with coal and consumable fuels, aluminum, and 
diversified chemicals (all “commodity focus/cost driven”).207 The 
category of casinos and gambling is grouped with aerospace and 
defense, construction and engineering, cable TV networks, home 
furnishing retail, and IT consulting (“service and product focus”).208 
The specific considerations for each sub-factor are at least as arbitrary 
as the group weighting determinations, and include their own detailed 
appendices, tables, and subjective factors. In making determinations 
related to the “competitive advantage” sub-factor, S&P considers the 
following: “Strategy; Differentiation/uniqueness, product 
positioning/bundling; Brand reputation and marketing; Product/service 
quality; Barriers to entry, switching costs; Technological advantage and 
capabilities, technological displacement; and Asset profile.”209 For the 
“scale, scope, and diversity” sub-factor, S&P considers, “Diversity of 
product or service range; Geographic diversity; Volumes, size of 
markets and revenues, and market shares; and Maturity of products or 
services.”210 For the “operating efficiency” sub-factor, S&P considers, 
“Cost structure, Manufacturing processes, Working capital management, 
and Technology.”211 
Once these sub-factor calculations are made, S&P combines the 
preliminary competitive position assessment with its profitability 
assessment to get a result that is biased in favor of the preliminary 
competitive position assessment.212 There is yet another grid setting 
forth this supposed balancing.213 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
207. Id.  
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 57–58. 
210. Id. at 60–62. 
211. Id. at 63–64. 
212. Id. at 29. 
213. Id. at 29 tbl.16. 
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 Preliminary Competitive Position Assessment 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 
Profitability 2 1 2 3 3 4 5 
Assessment  3 2 2 3 4 4 5 
 4 2 3 3 4 4 5 
 5 2 3 4 4 5 6 
 6 2 3 4 5 5 6 
 
Table 2: 
Determination of “Competitive Position” Assessment 
 
Note that this grid replicates many of the bizarre discontinuous 
characteristics of the previous grids. Then, once S&P has calculated the 
CICRA and competitive position assessment for a particular company, it 
matches them against each other in order to determine the company’s 
business risk profile, based on the following grid214: 
 
 
 CICRA 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 1 1 1 2 3* 5 
Competitive 2 1 2 2 3 4 5 
Position 3 2 3 3 3 4 6 
Assessment  4 3 4 4 4 5 6 
 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 
 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Table 3: 
 Determination of “Business Risk” Profile 
 
Note that this grid also replicates most of the characteristics of the 
previous mappings in the country-industry grid, but with a few even 
stranger changes. First, the business risk profile is slightly higher for 
companies with a CICRA of 1. Second, companies with a CICRA of 5 
are potentially given a business risk profile of 2, depending on a range of 
subjective factors.215 S&P also includes several “weighted” factors, 
                                                     
214. See id. at 7. 
215. For example, S&P notes that a business risk profile of 2 may be assigned to a company 
with a CICRA of 5 if, among other things, “[t]he company’s competitive position within its sector 
transcends its industry risks due to unique competitive advantages with its customers, strong 
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depending on the company’s different business lines and industries, but 
only if they exceed a specified fixed percentage (e.g., 5% of the 
company’s sales).216 Once again, there is no transparency regarding 
these mappings, and S&P does not cite to any literature that might 
support them. 
More important, the methodology is not replicable. There are enough 
numbers and charts to lend the appearance of objectivity, and yet the 
underlying determinants of the rating remain hidden. The business risk 
assessment methodology is a black box, within a black box, within a 
black box. 
2. Financial Risk Assessment 
After the business risk assessment, the revised S&P methodology 
turns to the second key determinant of an anchor rating: the financial 
risk assessment. The analysis of financial risk assessment is focused on a 
company’s pattern of cash flow generation relative to its cash 
obligations. In S&P’s judgment, such analysis “is often the best 
indicator of a company’s financial risk.”217 
Indeed, there are well-established methodologies that assess financial 
risk, such as Altman Z-Scores. Altman Z-Scores are based on 
transparent and replicable measures derived from financial statement 
information about cash flow generation relative to cash obligations, 
including variables such as working capital, retained earnings, earnings 
before interest and tax, and sales, as compared to total assets; and the 
market value of equity relative to total liabilities.218 Alternatively, 
consulting firms such as Kamakura, as well as smaller credit rating 
agencies such as Kroll, provide credit risk assessment that is more 
detailed and analytical, albeit not transparent or replicable to the same 
degree as Altman Z-scores.219 
In contrast, S&P’s financial risk assessment is facile, even compared 
to what is taught in basic law and finance courses.220 Its calculation of a 
                                                     
operating efficiencies not enjoyed by the large majority of the industry, or scale/scope/diversity 
advantages that are well beyond the large majority of the industry.” Id. at 7. 
216. Id. at 8. 
217. Id. at 29. 
218. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589 (1968). Altman Z-Scores, and related methodologies, 
continue to be widely used today. 
219. See Kamakura, supra note 10.  
220. See, e.g., ALAN R. PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH, chs. 9–10 (2d ed. 2014) (describing various analytic approaches to financial statement 
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company’s financial risk assessment follows several steps. According to 
S&P: 
We derive the final cash flow/leverage assessment for a 
company by determining the relevant core ratios, anchoring a 
preliminary cash flow assessment based on the relevant core 
ratios, determining the relevant supplemental ratio(s), adjusting 
the preliminary cash flow assessment according to the relevant 
supplemental ratio(s), and, finally, modifying the adjusted cash 
flow/leverage assessment for any material volatility.221  
Unlike well-established financial risk assessment methodologies, the 
calculations at each step are hidden; one cannot precisely replicate how 
S&P is making determinations at each stage. 
S&P also provides that a firm’s “financial policy” or “financial 
discipline” can change its financial risk profile.222 Such changes are 
based on a subjective assessment by S&P employees.223 S&P anticipates 
that corporate managers will find it difficult to assess how S&P might 
assess these subjective factors, so the methodology includes five case 
examples, presumably to give some guidance.224 However, those case 
examples raise more questions than they answer. Consider the following 
example: 
Example 5: A company (not owned by a financial sponsor) has 
very solid financial ratios, providing it with meaningful 
flexibility for M&A when compared with management’s long-
term stated financial policy. Also, its stock price performance is 
somewhat below that of its closest industry peers. Although we 
have no recent evidence of any aggressive financial policy steps, 
we fundamentally believe that, over the long-term term, the 
company will end up using its financial flexibility for the right 
M&A opportunity, or alternatively return cash to 
shareholders.225 
What kind of an impact might the managers of such a company 
expect would arise from the subjective considerations made by S&P 
employees? All the objective indicia are positive, including solid 
financial ratios. Moreover, the example explicitly assumes that “we have 
                                                     
and valuation analysis). 
221. S&P’s, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 30. 
222. See id. at 43–49. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 73–74. 
225. See id. at 74. 
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no recent evidence of any aggressive financial policy steps.”226 Any 
reasonable reading of the example would suggest that the subjective 
interpretation should be positive. 
Yet S&P’s answer to Example 5 is jarring: a one-notch downgrade: 
Likely outcome: Negative financial policy impact. Long-term 
event risk derived from M&A cannot be built into forecasts nor 
shareholder returns (share buybacks or one-off dividends) be 
built into forecasts to attempt aligning projected ratios with 
stated long-term financial policy levels. This is because our 
forecasts are based on realistic and reasonably predictable 
assumptions for the medium term. The anchor will be adjusted 
down, by one notch or more, because of the negative financial 
policy assessment.227 
In this case, S&P’s methodology leads to a subjective negative 
adjustment, the opposite of the one many scholars cited as arising during 
the years before the recent financial crisis.228 That distinction is 
important. My argument here is not that S&P’s methodology necessarily 
leads to unrealistically optimistic ratings. Nor is it specifically that 
S&P’s methodology leads to ratings that are unjustifiably high. Indeed, 
the opposite might very well be the case. Instead, my claim is that the 
methodology is unpredictable and indecipherable. It is not replicable. 
Neither an issuer nor an investor can read S&P’s revised methodology 
closely and anticipate what their credit rating will be at any given 
moment, or how any actions will impact future ratings. This opacity is 
particularly important for investors. It means that the credit rating’s 
utility does not derive from a transparent understanding of the process. 
3. Anchor Rating 
Once an S&P analyst has assessed business and financial risk, the 
next step in S&P’s revised methodology combines the business and 
financial risk profiles to arrive at an “anchor” rating, as follows229: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
226. Id. 
227. See id. 
228. See Griffin & Tang, supra note 111, at 1307. 
229. S&P’s, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at B. 
11 - Partnoy.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2017  10:25 AM 
1454 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1407 
 
 Financial Risk Profile 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 aaa/aa+ aa a+/a a- bbb bbb-
/bb+ 
Business 2 aa/aa- a+/a a-/bbb+ bbb bb+ bb 
Risk 
Profile 
3 a/a- bbb+ bbb/bbb- bbb-
/bb+ 
bb  b+ 
 4 bbb/bbb- bbb- bb+ bb bb- b 
 5 bb+ bb+ bb bb- b+ b/b- 
 6 bb- bb- bb-/b+ b+ b b- 
 
Table 4:  
Determination of “Anchor Rating” 
 
The differences among the cells in the grid raise numerous additional 
methodological questions.230 What is the rationale for having two 
possible ratings in some circumstances but not others? Why aren’t the 
changes in anchor ratings consistent for different changes in financial 
risk and business risk profiles? For example, why does the anchor rating 
fall at least one rank for declines in the financial risk rating below 2 but 
remain the same between 1 and 2? Why doesn’t the anchor rating change 
by a consistent number of notches for given changes in the financial and 
business risk profiles? For example, for numerous cells in the chart, the 
decline in anchor rating for a one point decline in either business or 
financial risk profile is one notch (e.g., a company with a financial risk 
profile of 4 loses 1 notch moving from a business risk profile of 4 to 5 or 
5 to 6), while other declines in anchor rating for similar changes are two 
notches (e.g., a company with a financial risk profile of 4 loses 2 notches 
moving from a business risk profile of 1 to 2). S&P’s disclosures about 
its methodology do not make it possible to replicate these results or even 
understand the potential bases for them. 
The revised S&P methodology provides that there are additional 
rating factors that can modify the anchor rating. These include 
“diversification/portfolio effect, capital structure, financial policy, 
liquidity, and management and governance.”231 S&P’s other ratings 
                                                     
230. Note that S&P uses lower case letters for its anchor ratings, presumably to distinguish them 
from the final upper case letter ratings. For cells that have two possible ratings, S&P states it will 
use the higher rating when the business risk profile is stronger, and the lower rating when it is 
weaker. See id. 
231. Id. at 3. In the next section, I focus on the importance of the “diversification/portfolio 
effect,” given the importance of correlation and diversification both in the financial crisis and today.  
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adjustment factors also include variables and approaches that are also 
problematic and arbitrary in various ways, and then refer the reader to 
the relevant sections for details. For example, the final adjustments 
related to “capital structure” in the methodology include arbitrary 
assessments of a company’s capital structure as “neutral,” “negative,” or 
“very negative.”232 Likewise, assessments of “financial policy” or 
“financial discipline” are “positive,” “neutral,” or “negative.”233 
4. Discretion and Subjective Adjustments to Credit Ratings 
The analysis of the above variables is not the end of the 
methodological process. In addition to analyzing various credit risks, 
both Moody’s and S&P embed a significant amount of analyst discretion 
in their ratings.234 One possible rationale for doing so is that discretion 
preserves the capacity of rating agencies to avoid sudden upgrades and 
downgrades. In other words, discretion and subjectivity preserve 
stability. 
Obviously, investors value stability. However, stability is less useful 
if it is achieved at the expense of accuracy and transparency. Moreover, 
any investor preference for stability is, at least in part, driven by reliance 
on ratings. Even the rating agencies admit that when investors rely on 
ratings as tools to constrain investment choices, it necessarily follows 
that they will prefer that those ratings remain stable, so that they are not 
continuously forced to trade their portfolios. For example, Moody’s has 
noted that, “ratings are used by investors as governance tools to monitor 
and to constrain the investment choices available to portfolio managers 
they employ. When, for example, a security is downgraded into the 
speculative-grade rating range, some portfolio managers are required to 
sell their holdings.”235 
Fudge factors such as “comparable ratings analysis” enable the rating 
agencies to achieve stability by avoiding transparency in their analysts’ 
discretionary use of financial variables.236 Comparable ratings analysis 
“reflects the need to ‘fine-tune’ ratings outcomes, even after the use of 
                                                     
232. See id. at 39. 
233. See id. at 43–44, 47–48. 
234. Studies of CDO ratings found that discretion and subjective adjustments were part of the 
approach to credit ratings before the financial crisis. See Griffin & Tang, supra note 111, at 1293. 
The evidence discussed here shows that such subjectivity continues after the financial crisis. 
235. See, e.g., MOODY’S INV’R SERV., MOODY’S SPECIAL COMMENT: ANALYZING THE 
TRADEOFF BETWEEN RATINGS ACCURACY & STABILITY 2 (2006). 
236. S&P’s, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 3 (“Comparable ratings analysis is 
the last analytical factor under the criteria to determine the final [rating] on a company.”). 
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each of the other modifiers.”237 If the rating agencies’ methodology led 
to accurate ratings, such fine-tuning typically would be unnecessary, or 
at least it would be rare. But S&P has warned that, in fact, fudge factors 
are likely to be needed: “[a] positive or negative assessment is therefore 
likely to be common rather than exceptional.”238 
Moreover, subjective adjustments can include issues or variables that 
no reasonable person would anticipate being part of a credit rating 
assessment. For example, S&P’s own descriptions acknowledge the 
subjective and arbitrary nature of subjective adjustments: “[w]e also 
consider additional factors not already covered, or existing factors not 
fully captured, in arriving at the [final rating]. Such factors will 
generally reflect less frequently observed credit characteristics, may be 
unique, or may reflect unpredictability or uncertain risk attributes, both 
positive and negative.”239 
Recent research has found subjectivity matters in a deleterious way: 
the major credit rating agencies actually embrace and reward opacity and 
complexity.240 Specifically, the major credit rating agencies favor 
products that are more opaque and give higher ratings to more complex 
products.241 In other words, the credit rating agencies appear to be more 
willing to trust issuers or arrangers as it becomes more difficult to figure 
out the substance and risk of the products. 
One explanation for the rating agencies rewarding opacity and 
complexity is that complex products are more likely to be rated based on 
trust, just as trust in information intermediaries rises when there is a 
                                                     
237. Id. at 12. 
238. Id. at 49. S&P’s “holistic” analysis is nakedly subjective:  
A company receives a positive assessment if we believe, in aggregate, its relative ranking 
across the subfactors typically to be at the higher end of the range; A company receives a 
negative assessment if we believe, in aggregate, its relative ranking across the subfactors 
typically to be at the lower end of the range; A company receives a neutral assessment if we 
believe, in aggregate, its relative ranking across the subfactors typically to be in line with the 
middle of the range. 
Id. at 50. 
239. See id. S&P’s changes in methodology appear to have be driven by result-related 
backtesting. For example, S&P announced along with its methodological changes that:  
We expect about 5% of corporate industrial companies and utilities ratings within the scope 
of the criteria to change. Of that number, we expect approximately 90% to receive a one-notch 
change, with the majority of the remainder receiving a two-notch change. We expect the ratio 
of upgrades to downgrades to be around 3:1.  
Id. at 4. 
240. See Andra Ghent, Walter Torous & Rossen Valkanov, Complexity in Structured Finance 
(Jan. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://burridgecenter.colorado.edu/html/research/ 
Ghent_Andra_SecurityComplexity.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GRA-GNE7]. 
241. Id. 
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need based on information asymmetry. Another theory is that complex 
products are an area where rating agency misbehavior becomes harder to 
observe. Complexity and opacity might be good for rating agencies, and 
perhaps even for some issuers, but they are not so good for investors. 
This new evidence suggests that rating agency methodologies continue 
to be opaque, just as they were before the financial crisis. 
B. Two Flaws 
I next turn to two specific examples of methodological flaws: the 
impact of diversification on credit ratings and the credit rating 
methodology applicable to investment holding companies. Both 
diversification and investment holding companies are areas that reveal 
ongoing methodological weaknesses in the major credit rating agencies’ 
revised approaches. 
1. Diversification 
Mistaken assessments of diversification and correlation were at the 
core of the financial crisis.242 Both market participants and the credit 
rating agencies failed to understand the extent to which the default risks 
associated with various subprime mortgage-related assets were highly 
correlated, particularly given the effects of a sharp decline in housing 
prices. Correlation generally is one of the most difficult and complex 
topics in finance and financial practice. Unfortunately, S&P treats 
diversification and correlation in a simplistic manner. 
It is evident from S&P’s consideration of the impact of diversification 
on its revised methodology that it took the concepts of diversification 
correlation seriously. S&P’s degree of seriousness increased after it 
proposed revisions to its diversification-related methodology and 
received comments from market participants. For example, in its 
proposed revisions to its methodology—its initial draft of its 
methodology—S&P used casual language, noting: “[u]nder the proposed 
criteria, diversification/portfolio effect applies to companies that we 
regard loosely as conglomerates.”243 But in the final methodology, the 
word “loosely” disappeared, even though the substance of S&P proposed 
methodology survived intact.244 S&P apparently recognized the concerns 
                                                     
242. See Partnoy, Overdependence, supra note 17. 
243. STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., Proposed Methodology, in REQUEST FOR 
COMMENT: CORPORATE CRITERIA 38 (2013). 
244. See S&P’s, CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 37. 
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about its approach to diversification and wanted to signal that its new 
methodology addressed those concerns by deleting the word “loosely.” 
In its revised methodological approach to diversification and 
correlation, S&P enumerates three categories for a conglomerate’s 
“diversification/portfolio effect”: “1, significant diversification; 2, 
moderate diversification; or 3, neutral.”245 An assessment of significant 
or moderate diversification potentially raises the issuer’s anchor.246 To 
achieve an assessment of “significant diversification, an issuer should 
have “uncorrelated diversified businesses whose breadth is among the 
most comprehensive of all conglomerates’.”247 To achieve an assessment 
of “moderate” diversification, an issuer typically would have a “range of 
uncorrelated diversified businesses that provide meaningful benefits of 
diversification with the expectation of lower earnings volatility through 
an economic cycle than an undiversified company’s.”248 
These distinctions are amorphous, and they have significant 
consequences. The “diversification/portfolio effect” is arguably one of 
the most important, if not the most important, modifications to the 
“anchor” rating in S&P’s new methodology. As the chart below shows, 
the diversification/portfolio effect can add as many as two notches to a 
company’s rating.249 
 
 Business Risk Profile 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Diversification/ 1 +2 +2 +2 +1 +1 0 
Portfolio 2 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 0 
Effect 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5:  
Impact of Diversification/Portfolio Effect on the “Anchor Rating” 
 
The new S&P criteria apply to “companies that we regard as 
conglomerates.”250 How does one determine whether to regard a 
company as a conglomerate? The answer appears at first to be a bright 
line: a conglomerate is a company with three significant and separate 
                                                     
245. See id. at 38. 
246. Id.  
247. See id. (noting that “[t]his assessment indicates that we expect the conglomerate’s earnings 
volatility to be much lower through an economic cycle than an undiversified company’s”). 
248. See id. 
249. Id. at 9. 
250. See id. at 37. 
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business lines.251 However, the determination of whether a business 
“counts” as one of three separate business lines is subjective, with only 
rough guidelines about what “usually” would constitute a distinct 
business segment.252 
Strangely, the conglomerate effect is only a plus or neutral factor (but 
not a negative one).253 The description of the methodology promises 
that, to the extent there are any negatives associated with a 
conglomerate, those will be captured elsewhere in S&P’s 
methodology.254 The extent of the overlap is not transparent: it is not 
clear how diversification, or a lack of diversification, would matter on a 
net basis to S&P’s adjustment. 
Interestingly, in its new diversification-related methodology, S&P 
stated that its revised approach was based on academic research. S&P 
included a brief section in an appendix to its methodology, citing one 
academic article and one trade publication in support of S&P’s 
conclusion that diversified conglomerate firms had an advantage over 
single-sector focused firms.255 
Generally, S&P does not cite extensively to academic literature or 
engage with academic work to the same degree as Moody’s. S&P Global 
Ratings conferences are directed primarily at networking and describing 
S&P ratings in different regions.256 In contrast, Moody’s conferences, 
though also trade focused, tend to be more analytical and 
comprehensive.257 Moody’s also takes a more academic and analytical 
approach generally, perhaps because of its 2002 acquisition of 
                                                     
251. See id. (“For the purpose of these criteria, a conglomerate would have at least three 
business lines, each contributing a material source of earnings and cash flow.”). 
252. See id. (“Usually the smallest of at least three distinct business segments/lines would 
contribute at least 10% of either EBITDA or FOCF and the largest would contribute no more than 
50% of EBITDA or FOCF.”). 
253. See id. (“This assessment will have either a positive or neutral impact on the anchor.”). 
254. See id. (“We would capture any potential factor that weakens a company’s diversification, 
including poor management, in our management and governance assessment.”). 
255. See id. at 70 (citing Venkat Kuppuswamy & Belén Villalonga, Does Diversification Create 
Value in the Presence of External Financing Constraints? Evidence from the 2007–2009 Financial 
Crisis (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-101, 2010) and Philip Beckmann, et al., The Power 
of Diversified Companies During Crises, BOS. CONSULTING GRP.: BCG.PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 25, 
2012), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/value_creation_strategy_management_two 
_speed_economy_power_diversified_companies_during_crises/ [https://perma.cc/C3F6-327L]). 
256. See Webcasts & Events, S&P GLOBAL RATINGS, https://www.spratings.com/en_US/ 
webcasts-events [https://perma.cc/TA3Y-VUGN] (including the “Monte Carlo Reinsurance Round-
Table” and the “Annual Nigeria Ratings & Capital Markets Conference”). 
257. See Events, MOODY’S CORP., https://www.moodys.com/newsandevents/events 
[https://perma.cc/7UJV-WFW8] (including events on “Corporate Credit Rating Analysis” and 
“Moody’s Project Finance Masterclass”). 
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Kealhofer, McQuown, and Vasicek (KMV), a sophisticated provider of 
quantitative credit analytics.258 Moody’s regularly interfaces with 
academic institutions and researchers, and its senior risk officer has been 
engaged regularly in research and has taught at top business schools.259 
Moody’s co-sponsors academic conferences and supports outside 
scholars who act as consultants and advisors.260 
Accordingly, S&P’s reliance on academic research in this area is 
notable. Its reliance on these two articles in particular is significant for 
several reasons. First, S&P’s ratings methodology changed in a way that 
favored diversified conglomerate firms—and that disfavored 
undiversified firms—based on a cursory analysis of research about the 
financial crisis. Second, S&P’s ratings methodology change was based 
on market measures of risk. One of the key measures cited in the 
research was credit default swap spreads, which were lower during the 
crisis for conglomerate firms.261 
More fundamentally, S&P misinterpreted the research it cited. Even 
the Boston Consulting Group paper S&P relied on—an unpublished 
work by consultants—concluded that conglomerates generally had an 
equity discount, meaning that the fact that a company was a 
conglomerate made it less—not more—valuable.262 To the extent the 
overall health and value of a company mattered to its ability to pay its 
debts, the fact that it is a conglomerate is an overall negative. In other 
words, based on the consulting paper S&P cited, the diversification 
effect should have been the opposite of the one S&P actually 
implemented. 
                                                     
258. See History of KMV, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, http://www.moodysanalytics.com/About-
Us/History/KMV-History [https://perma.cc/VJ9P-EP3P]. 
259. See Speaker Bios: Richard Cantor, MOODY’S, 
https://www.moodys.com/microsites/crc2010/bios.htm [https://perma.cc/4XQ5-RX7E] (describing 
Moody’s Chief Risk Officer, Richard Cantor, who holds a Ph.D. in economics, was a researcher at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and has taught at UCLA, Ohio State, NYU, and Columbia). 
260. See Moody’s Academic Committee, MOODY’S, https://www.moodys.com/microsites/ 
crc2010/mdyacad.htm [https://perma.cc/3PW4-ZL2K] (describing Moody’s “Academic 
Committee,” which has been meeting semi-annually since 2001 and reviews and supports research). 
Both S&P and Moody’s also devote substantial resources to lobbying and political contributions. 
See, e.g., Robert Schroeder, Moody’s, S&P Lobbying Spending on Rise, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 9, 
2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/moodys-sp-lobbying-spending-on-rise-2011-
08-09 [https://perma.cc/L38J-XNGM] (citing estimates of 2010 lobbying expenditures of $1.65 
million for S&P, $1.53 million for Moody’s, and $440,000 for Fitch). 
261. See S&P’S CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 70. 
262. Philip Beckmann, et al., The Power of Diversified Companies During Crises, BOS. 
CONSULTING GRP.: BCG.PERSPECTIVES (Jan. 25, 2012), https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/ 
articles/value_creation_strategy_management_two_speed_economy_power_diversified_companies
_during_crises/ [https://perma.cc/C3F6-327L]). 
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Moreover, to the extent the diversification benefit occurs, it appears to 
occur most predominantly during times of crisis.263 Accordingly, the 
accurate way to assess the effect of being a conglomerate would be that 
it would have an overall negative impact, but that this impact would be 
less negative during times of crisis. In other words, S&P should overall 
give conglomerates a lower rating generally, but should include a 
mechanism that can quickly upgrade a conglomerate in times of crisis. 
This is arguably the approach rating agencies should have taken to 
diversified pools of RMBS. Before the crisis, an accurate rating 
methodology would have given the various tranches significantly lower 
ratings. Then, when the crisis occurred, the ratings of the most 
diversified tranches should have been upgraded, not downgraded. Such 
an approach would achieve the counter-cyclicality favored by 
commentators on macro-prudential regulation.264 
It is difficult to anticipate how significantly this change in ratings 
methodology might be. Since 2013, there has been a substantial increase 
in market-concentration driven mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
activity, in many cases unwinding the spin-offs and carve-outs that 
occurred during the 1980s and 1990s as businesses became more 
streamlined and efficient.265 Might credit ratings create incentives for 
1960s-style conglomeration? Academic research has shown that even 
though there are theoretical arguments that diversified firms might 
increase profits and value by pooling different lines of business, in fact 
shares of diversified firms sell at a discount in the markets, in part 
because of the agency costs that arise for diversified firms.266 
Moreover, the effects of diversification on corporate creditworthiness 
are far more complicated than the simplistic conclusion that diversified 
companies are less likely to default. For example, to the extent the 
markets regard diversified companies as more creditworthy due to their 
diversification, those companies will have lower cost of debt capital and 
perhaps greater levels of debt than they otherwise would have. A 
                                                     
263. See S&P’S CORPORATE METHODOLOGY, supra note 193, at 70 (citing KUPPUSWAMY & 
VILLALONGA, supra note 255). 
264. See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014). 
265. See Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated? (Oct. 2016) (unpublished manuscript)  https://finance.eller.arizona.edu/sites/finance 
/files/grullon_11.4.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/77C2-YZ66]. 
266. See, e.g., Owen A. Lamont & Christopher Polk, Does Diversification Destroy Value? 
Evidence from Industry Shocks, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 51 (2002), Raghuram Rajan, Henri Servaes & 
Luigi Zingales, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. 
FIN. 35 (2000) (finding that diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal 
capital market hypothesis). 
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company with a higher debt capacity due to diversification can assume 
more debt, and arguably has an optimal capital structure that includes 
more debt. Indeed, some research on the effects of diversification on 
capital structure conclude that, although there can be positive effects 
from diversification, there can be negative effects as well.267 
In sum, with respect to the effects of diversification on corporate 
ratings, S&P learned and implemented the opposite lessons it should 
have. Many market participants apparently failed to understand the 
extent of S&P’s rating change in this respect and have continued to rely 
on those ratings without making any adjustment for S&P’s new 
diversification-related methodology. 
2. Investment Holding Companies 
Whereas diversification is a factor in various ratings methodologies, it 
also is useful to look separately at the credit rating agencies’ 
independent approaches to rating a particular group of issuers. Much of 
the above discussion related generally to corporate issuers. The Article 
now turns from the general corporate issuer approach to the particular 
methodologies that both Moody’s and S&P apply to the category of 
issuers known as “investment holding companies.”268 This section 
discusses Moody’s first, and then S&P. 
Investment holdings companies (IHCs) are a useful microcosm 
through which to view the major credit rating agencies’ revised 
                                                     
267. See, e.g., Maurizio La Rocca, Tiziana La Rocca, Dionigi Gerace & Ciorstan J. Smark, The 
Effect of Diversification on Capital Structure, 49 ACCT. & FIN. 799 (2009) (citing various theories 
in the finance literature and demonstrating the potential of both positive and negative effects). 
268. Moody’s has published several documents describing its methodological approach to 
investment holding companies. See MOODY’S CORP., GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOLDING COMPANIES: 
RATING METHODOLOGY (2007) [hereinafter MOODY’S 2007 IHC METHODOLOGY] (describing the 
initial Moody’s approach); MOODY’S INV’RS SERV., INVESTMENT HOLDINGS COMPANIES: ONE SIZE 
DOES NOT FIT ALL (2015) [hereinafter MOODY’S ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL] (analyzing 
investment holding companies); MOODY’S INV’RS SERV., INVESTMENT HOLDING COMPANIES AND 
CONGLOMERATES (2015) [hereinafter MOODY’S IHCS & CONGLOMERATES] (describing Moody’s 
revised methodological approach). S&P also has published several documents, including as part of a 
request for comments process. See STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGSDIRECT, RATING METHODOLOGY 
FOR EUROPEAN INVESTMENT HOLDING AND OPERATING HOLDING COMPANIES (2004) [hereinafter 
S&P’S EUROPEAN HOLDING COMPANIES MEHODOLOGY] (describing the initial S&P approach); 
STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., REQUEST FOR COMMENT: METHODOLOGY: INVESTMENT 
HOLDING COMPANIES (2014) [hereinafter S&P’S 2014 RFC] (soliciting comments from market 
participants); STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERV., RFC PROCESS SUMMARY: METHODOLOGY: 
INVESTMENT HOLDING COMPANIES (2015) [hereinafter S&P’S RFC PROCESS SUMMARY] 
(describing comments from market participants and responses); STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS 
SERV., METHODOLOGY: INVESTMENT HOLDING COMPANIES (2015) [hereinafter S&P’S 2015 IHC 
MEHODOLOGY] (describing S&P’s revised methodological approach).  
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methodological approaches. IHCs are large and important issuers that 
present many of the fundamental challenges associated with credit 
ratings. Moreover, both Moody’s and S&P have recently reconsidered 
and published new methodological approaches to rating IHCs. 
Accordingly, they are a useful example to consider. 
In October 2007, just as Moody’s and other credit rating agencies 
were downgrading numerous subprime mortgage-related securities, 
Moody’s published a new ratings methodology for IHCs. Moody’s 
defined an IHC as “either a public or a private group holding entity 
(‘Holdco’) that acts as a financial investor.”269 Although the term 
“investment holding companies” generally has broad connotations, 
Moody’s clarified that its use of the term “focuses more narrowly only 
on those companies for which the equity risk of subsidiaries is the main 
analytical driver, rather than their credit risk.”270 
At the time, Moody’s publicly rated only six investment holding 
companies.271 The total rated debt was just over $10 billion, most of 
which consisted of medium-term note borrowing programs as opposed 
to actual outstanding borrowings.272 Accordingly, the total universe of 
rated debt in this area was relatively small. 
Why would Moody’s create a separate methodological category for 
investment holding companies? The main reason appears to be that the 
two alternative methodologies that most closely applied to these 
companies were problematic for various reasons. One such methodology 
was that for conglomerates (such as Hutchinson Whampoa or Imperial 
Holdings). Moody’s rated numerous conglomerate holding companies, 
but in those cases the holding companies typically had a limited number 
(e.g., 3 to 5) of core assets in unrelated businesses that typically were 
majority owned and managed as a corporate group. The holding 
company conglomerates typically exercised strategic control of the 
subsidiaries, and potentially could shift credit support within the 
group.273 
A separate methodology was for asset management companies (such 
as AllianceBernstein or Fidelity). Moody’s rated numerous asset 
management companies, but in those cases the holding companies 
typically had a large number of investments in a wide range of assets 
                                                     
269. MOODY’S 2007 IHC METHODOLOGY, supra note 268, at 3. 
270. Id. at 1. 
271. Id. at 5. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 4. 
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that were held for investment purposes only. The asset manager 
provided investment services to investors and typically did not exercise 
strategic control or have the capacity to shift support. The mix of 
investments was variable and often included many short-term 
investments. There was no operational integration with any companies 
held within the investment portfolio. 
Investment holding companies had some characteristics that fit each 
methodology. With respect to some investments, particularly those in 
which the IHC held a majority stake, the IHC might resemble a 
conglomerate group: it might be more actively involved and engaged in 
some operational aspects of a subsidiary business. But with respect to 
other investments, particularly for minority stakes, an investment 
holding company might follow more of an investment management 
strategy with less involvement. The degree of control and management 
also varied. 
Moreover, there were other nuances among IHCs. Many IHCs had a 
history of being majority owned by a family (Moody’s methodology 
excluded private equity firms). In addition, there might be financing at 
the parent investment holding company level, which was typically 
clearly separate and without recourse. For some IHCs, the parent 
typically did not provide guarantees to subsidiaries nor were there 
typically cross-default clauses associated with subsidiary debts.274 
Accordingly, there was need for methodological clarification. 
On October 8, 2015, Moody’s published a research piece on IHCs 
entitled “One Size Does Not Fit All.”275 The piece included qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of credit risk, and disclosed some details about 
each IHC it rated, including a rating, a rating outlook, and a description 
of various factors. It set forth five key ratings factors—asset quality, 
management discipline and transparency, market value based leverage, 
cash coverage, and liquidity—and gave each entity a rating score in each 
area.276 Moody’s mentioned the IHCs that were outliers in each area277 
and noted that the boundary between IHCs and conglomerates was, in 
many respects, blurred.278 
Moody’s explicitly noted that the scoring of the key factors could be 
influenced by other factors.279 For example, an IHC’s influence over 
                                                     
274. Id. at 3.  
275. See MOODY’S ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL, supra note 268, at 1. 
276. Id. 
277. See id. at 3–4. 
278. See id. at 4. 
279. Id. at 5. 
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dividends might reliably translate into strong interest coverage, but it 
also might not.280 Moody’s included correlation-related issues, such as 
the relationship between IHC ratings and the ratings of their underlying 
investments.281 Moody’s examined average debt maturities and 
accounted for the maturity differences among IHCs both quantitatively 
and qualitatively.282 
Then, two months after issuing its analytics piece, Moody’s published 
its revised ratings methodology for IHCs.283 This new methodology 
replaced its 2007 methodology. Moody’s 2015 methodology uses the 
five above factors and weights them using a grid, not unlike S&P’s grid 
approach to corporate ratings. 
Instead of translating factors into a score from one to six, Moody’s 
simply uses its own ratings categories. For example, the “investment 
strategy” sub-factor carries a 10% weight and Moody’s describes what 
kind of judgment it would need to make about an IHC’s investment 
strategy to give it a Aa rating or a Baa rating.284 Likewise, asset quality 
carries a 40% weight and Moody’s describes similar kinds of 
judgments.285 Some of the analysis is quantitative, such as that for asset 
concentration, where “minimal concentration” means that the market 
value of the three largest investments is less than 10% of the total 
portfolio market value.286 Likewise, “business diversity” is calculated 
based on the number of sectors an IHC is invested in: more than thirteen 
sectors is Aaa; four to five sectors is Ba.287 Other factors, such as 
“investment portfolio transparency”288 are qualitative and include 
substantial latitude for analyst judgment and discretion. 
S&P’s approach historically has included many of the same 
weaknesses inherent in Moody’s approach. S&P’s corporate 
methodology does not cover IHCs. Indeed, before 2014, S&P 
approached IHCs as a separate part of its methodology for two 
categories of firms—European investment holding companies and 
operating holding companies—both of which were covered by related 
                                                     
280. See id.  
281. See id. at 11–12. 
282. See id. at 14–15. 
283. See MOODY’S IHCS & CONGLOMERATES, supra note 268, at 1. 
284. Id. at 10–11. 
285. Id. at 12–14. 
286. Id. at 12, 14. 
287. Id. at 14. 
288. Id. 
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methodologies.289 In its initial approach, published in 2004, S&P 
explicitly noted that its methodologies varied by company and depended 
on unique factors that combined portions of S&P’s approach to 
industrial conglomerates, investment holding companies, and operating 
holding companies.290 
On November 26, 2014, S&P published a request for comment on its 
proposed revisions to the approach it used to rate IHCs.291 On December 
1, 2015, after receiving feedback from market participants, S&P then 
published its final criteria for IHCs.292 
S&P’s prior methodology was qualitative and free form, leaving 
much of the analytical judgment and credit assessment to the ratings 
analyst. Its revised methodology is more structured, with factors such 
CICRA, discussed above.293 It essentially imports S&P’s new corporate 
methodology, thereby importing all of the flaws discussed above into its 
methodological approach to rating IHCs. 
S&P’s IHC methodology is not responsive to the basic idea of a credit 
rating: to be an assessment of the individual issuer’s underlying credit 
quality. Both qualitative and quantitative factors matter to ratings. 
Obviously, qualitative factors should be evaluated in a qualitative way; 
quantitative factors should be evaluated in a quantitative way. A 
fundamental difficulty arises when qualitative factors are scored in a 
quantitative way, and then quantitative adjustments are made in ways 
that become unmoored from any reasonable qualitative analysis. For 
example, some issuers have debt due immediately; others have longer-
term debt. The amount, maturity, and structure of debt are quantitative 
factors. Yet equally relevant are qualitative factors about that debt: how 
has it been managed historically, are there any unique features, how is 
cash used when debt is issued? 
The flaws in S&P’s inflexible approach are illustrated by its own 
requests for comment. On November 26, 2014, in its proposed 
methodology, S&P rated the IHC universe as “moderately high risk” 
category—category 4.294 S&P then copied the relevant methodology 
                                                     
289. See S&P’S EUROPEAN HOLDING COMPANIES METHODOLOGY, supra note 268, at 1. The 
coupling of these two categories appears to have been related to S&P’s organizational structure, and 
the European analysis that covered individual firms in each category. See id. at 1 (listing four 
primary credit analysts in the areas). 
290. See id. at 1–8. 
291. See S&P’S, RFC PROCESS SUMMARY, supra note 268, at 3. 
292. See id. 
293. Id. at 13–14. 
294. See S&P’S 2014 RFC, supra note 268, at 7. 
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from its corporate ratings for category 4. Then, on December 1, 2015, in 
its final approach, S&P rated the IHC universe as “intermediate risk”—
category 3.295 S&P then copied the quite different relevant methodology 
from its corporate ratings for category 3. S&P did not cite any evidence 
that IHC credit quality changed substantially from 2014 to 2015, and my 
research uncovered no such evidence. Yet the effect of its change was 
that it inflexibly imported a different approach. 
Another problem is apparent from S&P’s proposed approach to 
anchor ratings for IHCs, which would have been capped at aa regardless 
of financial risk score. IHCs appeared in category 4, indicating 
moderately high risk. But that proposed approach was obviously flawed: 
it treated IHCs as categorically riskier than both regulated utilities and 
pharmaceutical companies, for example. In fact, such a comparison is 
inapt: many IHCs are far less risky and the comparison is obviously 
apples to oranges. 
S&P revised its proposed IHC methodology in response to comments, 
and its final methodology reflects the relatively high credit quality and 
liquidity of many IHC issuers. But S&P’s abrupt reversal is telling. 
S&P’s methodological approach required a methodology that 
generalized about IHC issuers as being either “moderately high risk” or 
“intermediate risk.” This generalization then significantly impacted the 
treatment of different issuers. A high-quality IHC issuer would be rated 
more accurately in category 3. But a low-quality IHC issuer would be 
rated more accurately in category 4. Thus, both S&P’s old and new 
approaches lack the flexibility to arrive at accurate categories for 
individual IHCs. 
S&P’s insistence on shoehorning IHCs into aspects of its corporate 
ratings framework makes little sense. For example, the effect of S&P’s 
determination that IHCs generally fit category 3 is simply to truncate the 
CICRA versus investment position table, so that only CICRA categories 
3, 4, and 6 are represented. As S&P states in a footnote, “*CICRA 
assessments of (1), (2), and (5) do not apply to IHCs due to our assessed 
industry risk assessment of ‘intermediate’ (3).”296 Those categories 
might accurately describe some IHCs, but that doesn’t matter in S&P’s 
methodology, which leads them simply to disappear. More generally, the 
categorical industry risk scores do not capture the underlying credit 
quality of an individual IHC. As noted above, the IHC industry is not 
homogenous. IHCs invest in different categories of assets, in different 
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industries, with different credit qualities and risks. Some IHCs use debt 
to finance asset purchases; others do not. IHC debt varies substantially in 
maturity and structure. S&P’s IHC framework does not adequately 
account for this granularity. Nor does S&P’s methodology reward IHCs 
with good liquidity, management, or governance; instead, the focus is on 
downside adjustments.297 
Some of S&P’s proposed methodology was so arbitrary and 
inaccurate that it rose to the level of embarrassment. For example, S&P 
proposed a table that “classifies listed equity investments into four 
equity market groups by country, based on the volatility we have 
observed in that country’s main stock market index over the past 30 
years.”298 S&P then proposed using a thirty-year volatility measure of a 
country’s main stock index as an indicator of liquidity. The result of this 
approach was “Equity Market Groups” (EMGs), which separated 
countries into four categories. 
The EMGs categorizations were stunningly wrongheaded, and even 
contradicted S&P’s own ratings. For example, EMG 2 contained Asia-
Pacific, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, European Union, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, 
Southeast Asia, Spain, Sweden. EMG 3 contained Austria, Bahrain, 
Baltic, Caribbean, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, 
Eastern Europe, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Gulf Cooperation Council, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates.299 
These two EMG categories made little sense. For example, S&P’s 
proposed methodology would have treated IHCs with exposure to 
Mexico more favorably than those exposed to the United Arab Emirates, 
or IHCs with exposure to Spain more favorably than those exposed to 
Singapore. It also was striking that creditworthy sovereigns in major 
financial centers, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, were grouped with 
countries like Cyprus, Greece, and Latvia. Strangely, regions such as 
“Asia-Pacific” and “Southeast Asia” were in EMG 2, along with Spain, 
Portugal, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic, while several individual 
countries in the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia regions were in EMG 3. 
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This aspect of S&P’s methodological treatment was important, too: an 
IHC with a majority of its assets traded in countries rated EMG 3 or 4 
would have been subject to a cap with respect to this component. In 
other words, an IHC with the majority of its assets traded in Hong Kong 
would have a cap, whereas an IHC with the majority of its assets traded 
in the Slovak Republic would not. S&P’s proposed methodology was 
obviously flawed. 
S&P ultimately scrapped the concept of EMGs in its final IHC 
methodology, although it continued to rely on its Country Risk 
Assessment Methodology and Assumptions, which remained intact.300 In 
other words, S&P deleted some of the offending specific details in its 
proposed framework but retained the underlying country 
risk framework. Nevertheless, the fact that S&P proposed such a silly 
methodological approach is telling. It also is significant that S&P on its 
own, without input from market participants, would have implemented 
such an approach. 
One equally dubious concept that S&P proposed—and then retained 
in its final methodology—is a liquidity assessment based on the 
proportion of public versus private investments held by IHCs. S&P 
applies a simplistic formula to the percentage of publicly listed 
companies held by an IHC and then mechanically arrives at a liquidity 
assessment based on that percentage. According to S&P, “we view a 
significant investment in unlisted assets as a fundamental underlying 
weakness for an IHC.”301 Accordingly, an IHC that holds more than 80% 
listed companies receives a higher assessment than an IHC with 80% or 
below, 70% or below, and so on. The formula applies without regard to 
the actual liquidity of the underlying investments. In other words, some 
publicly listed securities might be illiquid, yet nevertheless receive a 
credit based on S&P’s liquidity assessment. Conversely, some unlisted 
securities might be relatively liquid (even though they are not traded on 
an exchange), but result in a lower assessment. Moreover, the formula 
ignores the fact that a company might hold unlisted securities of an 
entity that held stakes in publicly listed companies. 
In modern markets, there are good reasons for IHCs, or any investor, 
to hold substantial stakes in companies that are not publicly listed. The 
number of publicly listed companies is declining, and public companies 
are subject to onerous and costly reporting requirements. Unlisted 
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companies have the potential to benefit from a range of business 
opportunities, including the positive price performance of an initial 
public offering. Increasingly, privately listed companies, such as 
numerous “unicorns” (with more than a billion dollars of market 
capitalization), are exploring secondary trading markets that provide 
liquidity to investors. S&P’s liquidity assessment ignores these nuances. 
More generally, S&P’s IHC framework also suffers from the 
fundamental problem of quantifying qualitative factors. For example, 
consider S&P’s treatment of what it calls “Strategic Investment 
Capability.”302 S&P scores five SIC factors—investment discipline, risk 
analysis, return analysis, portfolio rotation, and value creation—on a 
three-point scale.303 Each factor is rated as above average, average, or 
below average.304 The criteria for each determination are often vague or 
indeterminate. For example, portfolio rotation is evaluated as “above 
average” if the IHC makes disposals “periodically,” is committed to “an 
effective strategy of portfolio rotation,” and “quickly” reinvests 
proceeds.305 Likewise, S&P categorizes IHCs generally as “intermediate 
risk” (meaning Industry Risk category 3) based exclusively on the IHC 
business model, without regard to the quantum of dividends or cash 
flows received relative to an IHC’s financial obligations.306 
Thus, S&P’s methodological framework for IHCs exhibits many of 
the same flaws that have plagued its earlier approaches. In particular, 
S&P’s approach to determining both business risk and financial risk 
profiles is seriously flawed, including its ill-conceived categorical 
approach to investment positions, asset risk, and leverage. S&P also 
employs arbitrary methodologies to combine business risk and financial 
risk profiles, as well as the other various proposed modifications and 
considerations that are important parts of S&P’s framework. 
As noted above, a sophisticated analysis of IHC credit would differ 
markedly from the Moody’s and S&P approaches. The analysis would 
include more subtle and sophisticated methods, including more specific 
analyses of financial ratios, income and cash flow variables, foreign 
exposure, document terms, option-adjusted valuation, simulations and 
stress tests, and analyses of recovery rates, market prices, and other 
variables.307 Moody’s and S&P’s methodologies are not sophisticated. 
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In sum, IHCs are a useful microcosm of the ongoing problems 
associated with credit rating agencies. My main empirical point here is 
that the problems are, at their core, methodological. Both Moody’s and 
S&P have opaque and often arbitrary ratings methodologies that benefit 
from opacity. There are few, if any, reputational, regulatory, or liability 
consequences related to its use of these flawed methodologies. 
Nevertheless, the ratings that result from the methodologies seem to 
have value in the marketplace. This is the continuing paradox of credit 
ratings: value without useful information. 
Overall, the above empirical investigation demonstrates that the major 
credit rating agencies have not substantially improved their 
methodological approaches since Dodd-Frank. Given the lack of 
oversight and accountability of credit rating agencies, this lack of 
improvement should not be surprising. Unfortunately, flawed 
methodologies remain part of what is (still) wrong with credit rating 
agencies. 
How might credit rating agencies be persuaded to improve their 
methodologies? In addition to the oversight and accountability 
recommendations above, the OCR might explore the agencies’ 
diversification and IHC methodologies during its upcoming annual 
reviews. SEC rules implemented pursuant to Dodd-Frank require that 
NRSROs “have policies and procedures” relating to their procedures and 
methodologies for determining credit ratings.308 The above analysis 
demonstrates significant errors with respect to those methodologies. 
Arguably, Moody’s and S&P should be required to publicize those 
errors, perhaps by posting a copy of this Article to an easily accessible 
portion of its corporate website.309 
This section has illustrated the serious and ongoing methodological 
flaws at the major credit rating agencies. One normative conclusion that 
arises from these flaws is simple: the agencies should improve their 
methodologies. But another, perhaps even more important conclusion 
and the central point of this Article is that to the extent these 
methologies do not improve, and accordingly credit ratings continue to 
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have little informational value, investors should not rely on credit 
ratings. 
CONCLUSION 
Some scholars have expressed skepticism about whether market 
participants can process complex financial information, particularly 
about structured finance and derivatives.310 Others have noted that 
market discipline often fails in financial regulation.311 These arguments 
suggest that information intermediaries can serve an important function 
in financial markets by filtering, processing, sorting, and condensing 
information. 
Unfortunately, decades of regulatory reliance have perverted this 
potentially valuable function with respect to the role of credit rating 
agencies. Dodd-Frank partially addressed this “regulatory license” 
problem, but many market participants continue to rely mechanistically 
on credit ratings. Regulatory licenses have proven to be quite sticky. 
Moreover, letter ratings are a crude mechanism for information 
intermediation. Letter ratings obscure the analysis of the key variables 
that matter in the analysis of credit: probability of default, expected 
recovery in the event of default, and the correlation of defaults. The 
methodologies critiqued in this Article are disconnected from that 
analysis. 
As of 2017, enough time had passed since the financial crisis and the 
resulting legal reforms to assess how much the credit rating industry has 
changed. The answer: not much. The major credit rating agencies 
continue to generate little informational value, and yet be rewarded 
handsomely for their ratings. They continue to operate as an oligopoly 
with special regulatory treatment. Congress should not permit the rating 
agencies—and the SEC—to flout Dodd-Frank. But even if Congress 
remains silent, investors should respond by reducing their reliance on 
credit ratings. 
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